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Smart devices (mobile devices, laptops, tablets, etc.) can receive signals from 
different radio frequency devices that are within range. As these devices move between 
networks (e.g., Wi-Fi hotspots, cellphone towers, etc.), they receive broadcast messages 
from access points, some of which can be used to collect useful information. This 
information can be utilized in a variety of ways, such as to establish a connection, to 
share information, to locate devices, and to identify users, which is central to this 
dissertation. The principal benefit of a broadcast message is that smart devices can read 
and process the embedded information without first being connected to the corresponding 
network. Moreover, broadcast messages can be received only within the range of the 
wireless access point that sends the broadcast, thus inherently limiting access to only 
those devices in close physical proximity, which may facilitate many applications that are 
dependent on proximity. In our research, we utilize data contained in these broadcast 
messages to implement a two-factor authentication (2FA) system that, unlike existing 
methods, does not require any extra effort on the part of the users of the system. By 
determining if two devices are in the same physical location and sufficiently close to each 
other, we can ensure that they belong to the same user. This system depends on 
something that a user knows, something that a user owns, and—a significant contribution 
of this work—something that is in the user’s environment. 
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Smart devices (phones, laptops, tablets, etc.) are electronic devices that are able to 
connect, share, and interact with each other via a variety of wireless protocols (e.g., 
Bluetooth, Zigbee, near-field communication (NFC), Wi-Fi, LiFi, 3G, etc.). Furthermore, 
they can operate, to some degree, autonomously. The advantage of these smart devices 
lies in their convenience and ubiquity. As of 2018, according to the Pew Research Center, 
96% of Americans own a cellphone, and 81% of them use smartphones as their primary 
means of online access; this practice is especially common among young adults [1]. In 
addition, nearly three quarters of American adults own traditional computer systems, 
while around half of Americans own tablets [1]. These smart devices can receive signals 
sent using different radio frequency technologies and from different networks within 
range. As the devices move between networks (e.g., wireless access points, cellphone 
towers, etc.), they receive broadcast messages. If the broadcast messages originate from a 
Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) network, they include several useful pieces of information that are 
relevant to this work, and which are discussed in the technical background section below. 
Specifically, this information can be utilized in a variety of ways, such as to establish a 
connection, share information, locate devices, and, most appropriately, identify users.  
Electronic authentication involves confirming a user’s identity based on a claim 




(1) the identification phase, and (2) the verification phase. In the identification phase, the 
system links a user to an identity through information provided by the user (e.g., a 
username). In the verification phase, the user’s identity is validated using another piece of 
authentication information (e.g., a password) [3]. In order to establish and trust the 
identity of a user, multiple factors should be used simultaneously during the 
authentication step. As described above, the information provided by Wi-Fi access points 
can be used in many ways. One use involves an additional layer of user authentication 
that effectively acts as a second factor. In the following section, we will study the 
different types of authentication credentials that can be used to verify the identity of 
users. 
1.1 Authentication Credentials 
 As cyberattacks have evolved, a diverse set of authentication methods has been 
developed to protect against them. The most common authentication methods fall into 
two categories: single-factor authentication (SFA) and two-factor authentication (2FA) 
(also known as dual-factor authentication (DFA)). A factor is considered to be one of the 
following characteristics: some place where a user is, something a user possesses, 
something a user is, something a user knows, or something a user does. These five 
elements are called authentication credentials. 
1.1.1 Something a User Knows 
When a user logs into an information system, the first task of authentication 
involves identification. This can be done by providing a username, for example. In order 




existing profile. This step could be done by providing something no one but that user 
knows, such as a password.  
Currently, passwords are the most common means of authentication. 
Nevertheless, a password alone is often considered a weak form of data protection [4]. 
Moreover, there are numerous types of attacks that target “something that a user knows,” 
such as brute force and dictionary-based attacks. In response to these attacks, users 
should take action to strengthen passwords. For example, to achieve higher security for 
user information, passwords should be unique and should contain upper- and lower-case 
letters, numbers, and special characters. 
1.1.2 Attacks on Passwords 
A user can follow the rules for making a password strong, but that does not 
necessarily mean that attackers will be thwarted. Listed below are some attacks that 
attackers have used to gain information related to user passwords. 
1.1.2.1 Social engineering 
This type of attack exploits weaknesses in human interaction and manipulates 
people to break through security barriers, gain access to systems, locations, or networks, 
or for financial gain. Phishing, shoulder surfing, and dumpster diving are some types of 
social engineering attacks that currently exist. Phishing is a method of obtaining personal 
information—such as a password—by disguising oneself as a truthful entity. Shoulder 
surfing is a technique for gaining a victim’s personal information by spying on a user or 
looking over a user’s shoulder. Dumpster diving is a scheme in which an attacker 
attempts to retrieve information from a victim’s trash or belongings, which may then be 




1.1.2.2 Capturing a password 
There are several ways to capture passwords from a network or a user device. On 
a network, for example, passwords can be obtained using man-in-the-middle or relay 
attacks. In these types of attacks, a malicious user inserts himself between two parties and 
obtains credential information such as a password. Furthermore, a man-in-the-middle 
attack involves an attacker compromising and potentially altering the communication 
between two parties. Relay attacks involve sniffing for valid data that has been sent by an 
authorized user, and subsequently relaying it to a destination host. This type of attack 
happens when a malicious user detects a network data packet, and then intercepts it and 
relays it as if it were his own. A keylogger attack is a type of attack that is implemented 
on the user’s end, where a password is captured using an application that listens to 
keystrokes on a computing system. 
The use of the aforementioned attacks is limited, because the attacker requires 
access to a user’s computer, or the attacker must observe a user entering a password. In 
both cases, the attacker must be physically present and in close proximity to the 
unsuspecting user.  However, many types of attacks require little to no communication 
with the targeted system. These types of attacks are called offline password recovery 
attacks. Examples include brute force attacks, dictionary attacks, hybrid attacks, and the 
use of rainbow tables.  These are discussed below. 
1.1.2.3 Brute force attack  
This attack involves the largely automated submission of every possible 
combination of letters, numbers, and special characters to attempt to match (and 




1.1.2.4 Dictionary attack 
This type of attack utilizes a dictionary (a list of candidate passwords) to discover 
a user’s actual password. Obviously, the user’s password must be in the dictionary for the 
attack to be successful.  However, it is possible to combine words from the dictionary to 
form more complex passphrases that the user may have used during authentication. This 
“hybrid attack” is discussed below. 
1.1.2.5 Hybrid attack  
This type of attack is a blend of both brute force and dictionary-based attacks. 
Characters are combined using a dictionary. Moreover, concatenations and/or 
combinations of words in a dictionary can also be implemented to attempt to determine a 
user's password. 
1.1.2.6 Rainbow tables 
These “tables” are simply pre-computed hashes of potential user passwords. Most 
secure database systems do not store user passwords directly. Instead, they store the one-
way hashes of user passwords. Because generating the hash of a password can be time 
consuming, it is often intractable to brute force or use a dictionary-based attack on such 
hashes. Rainbow tables can instead be used to make a direct comparison of the hashes 
stored in the databases of systems that are used to authenticate users. Although creating 
rainbow tables may take a significant amount of computational time, it only needs to be 
done once. There are many datasets of rainbow tables available online for the security 
community (and also for potential attackers). 
Each method of attack discussed above has unique characteristics; however, they 




information is protected by a password that can be compromised, a better way to defend 
against an attacker is needed. 
As cyber-attacks have evolved, passwords have become insufficient to protect 
user information. Without the appropriate precautions, which can be two factors of 
authentication, for example, an attacker need only determine a user's password to gain 
access to a system. Protecting data using only a password, considering the above methods 
of attack, is almost, in some cases, deemed unwise. However, there are methods for 
decreasing the vulnerability of a system by utilizing an extra layer of security; for 
example, by including another authentication factor: something that a user possesses. 
1.1.3 Something a User Possesses 
This category of authentication is based on items that a user physically possesses. 
These items are used along with passwords. Due to the usage of two types of 
authentication, what a user knows (a password) and what the user has (e.g., a mobile 
device that is typically carried), this type of authentication is usually referred to as two-
factor authentication (2FA). However, if a user were to use only one of the factors, it 
would be considered SFA (single-factor authentication). At present, the items that are 
commonly used to authenticate users are tokens, smart cards, and mobile devices. 
1.1.3.1 Tokens 
A token is a small electronic device with a light-emitting diode (LED) display 
screen. A token can be used instead of a password (what a user knows), and is a form of 
authentication that depends on what a user has. The method in which a token can be used 
is either to receive a one-time password (OTP) or to generate a OTP. There are two types 




code (HMAC)-based OTP (HOTP). A TOTP is a temporary passcode that changes after a 
set period of time. Usually, a TOTP is generated and displayed on the token’s LED 
screen once for a limited time. Because the token may not have a direct connection to the 
authentication entity, a shared algorithm between the token and the corresponding 
authentication entity would use the current time of day as one of its authentication 
factors. When a user logs in with a username and password, the code is then displayed on 
the token. After the user enters the token that is displayed, the authentication entity 
receives it and verifies that they are identical. The code must be used within the token’s 
predefined time limit. After the token's time limit is up, it can no longer be authenticated 
by the authentication entity, and the user is not allowed to access another session with 
that token. If the user is already logged in with the expired token, the user is then logged 
out. 
An HOTP is a OTP that changes when a specific event occurs. For example, when 
a user enters a personal identification number (PIN), this would then trigger the token to 
generate a new passcode. 
Tokens have some benefits over passwords. First, a password is static; it does not 
change unless the user changes it (or they are forced to do so), which gives an attacker a 
chance to recover it and subsequently use it. Alternatively, a token frequently generates a 
dynamic password that is valid for only one operation within a specific time, which 
creates a barrier to unauthorized access. 
1.1.3.2 Smart cards 
Smart cards are plastic cards that contain a microprocessor chip that holds data 




cards (ICCs). These smart cards can be used as personal identification, for authentication, 
and even for data storage. Smart cards can be implemented as contact cards, which 
requires physical contact, or contactless cards, where the information in the chip is 
transferred electronically. 
1.1.3.3 Mobile devices 
Today, mobile devices have overtaken tokens and smart cards. A code can be 
retrieved through an application on a mobile device, or as a text message that is sent to a 
user’s cellphone. In addition, through a mobile device, a user can ask to receive an HOTP 
passcode. 
To add an extra layer of security, we can use not only something that a user 
possesses, but also something that a user is. 
1.1.4 Something a User Is 
This type of authentication depends on the features and characteristics of a 
person. These features and characteristics can either be physical or non-physical. This 
form of authentication is known as biometric authentication. Physical biometric 
authentication is referred to as standard biometrics, while non-physical biometric 
authentication is referred to as cognitive biometrics. 
1.1.4.1 Standard biometric authentication 
Standard biometric authentication is a security process that relies on the 
distinctive physical characteristics of a user (what a user is) to verify that a user is who 
they claim to be. Standard biometric authentication can use fingerprints, palm profiles 
(i.e., veins in the palm), face recognition, palm prints, retina recognition, hand geometry, 




of biometric authentication used today. However, fingerprints are more often used than 
face recognition [5]. There are two different types of scanners for fingerprints: a static 
fingerprint scanner and a dynamic fingerprint scanner. With a static fingerprint scanner, a 
user must place the whole thumb or finger on an oval scanner window. A dynamic 
fingerprint scanner requires a user to place a part of a thumb or finger on a small scanner 
window. 
1.1.4.2 Cognitive biometric authentication 
Cognitive biometric authentication is a method that recognizes individuals based 
on their thoughts, perceptions, and observation processes using responses from nerve 
tissue. Nerve tissue is a major component of the nervous system, which consists of 
neurons [6]. The responses from a user’s nerve tissue can be obtained using many 
techniques; for example, by using an electroencephalogram (EEG), an electrocardiogram 
(ECG), or from an electrodermal response (EDR). These techniques are a way of 
recording brain activity that is produced during a practice activity, which can be either a 
mental or physical activity. 
In general, biometric authentication has its advantages. The first is better quality 
and security: using a unique feature of the human body for authentication creates an 
obstacle for an attacker that cannot be predicted: a user must be present to gain access. 
Second, a user’s biometric identity cannot be lost: because this category of authentication 
depends on a part of the human body, it is typically difficult to lose it or not have it. The 
third advantage is convenience: it eliminates many of the difficulties of the identification 
methods that are associated with what a user knows or what a user possesses, making 




disadvantages as well. For example, it is costly: a biometric authentication system 
typically costs a substantial amount of money to set up [7]. These costs could be due to 
both software and hardware requirements, and the system may even incur additional costs 
to maintain in the future. Also, there is some technical complexity: some organizations 
may not be in a position to have a high-level technician maintain and perform day-to-day 
front-end and back-end operations. The major disadvantage of a biometric authentication 
technique, however, is that once a system with a biometric signature is compromised, a 
user cannot “reset” or change his or her body. Because of this, it is advantageous to 
consider relying on something else to secure data; for example, the behavior of users (i.e., 
something that a user does). 
1.1.5 Something a User Does 
This is another type of authentication factor that is based on identifying and 
measuring patterns based on a person’s behavior while performing certain activities. This 
kind of authentication is known as behavioral biometrics. Keystroke dynamics and voice 
recognition are two examples of behavioral biometrics. 
1.1.5.1 Keystroke dynamics 
Keystroke dynamics uses recognition of the patterns of rhythm and timing created 
when an individual types on a keyboard. This method uses many measurements to study 
a person’s typing behavior, such as a dwell time: the duration of time that a key is 
pressed; flight time: the time duration in between releasing a key and pressing the next 
key; and common error: the errors that occur when a user types in a username or 
password, for example. The advantages of keystroke dynamics are its affordability (it 




does not need to take an extra step to be authenticated), and reliability (because this 
method is based on a user’s typing behavior, it can never be lost or deleted). Keystroke 
dynamics also has some disadvantages. For example, it generally suffers from low 
accuracy (a user’s typing pattern may change due to injury, exhaustion, or distraction), 
and it has low permanence (a user’s typing pattern may gradually change over time 
because they may get accustomed to typing a password, adapt to an input device, or 
increase their typing proficiency). 
1.1.5.2 Voice recognition 
The voice recognition technique analyzes a person’s voice to identify the unique 
characteristics to use when verifying their identity. Several characteristics, such as age, 
the shape and size of the mouth, the shape of the head, and the movement of one's jaw 
create a unique voice for every person. Like other types of factor authentication, voice 
recognition has advantages and disadvantages. Some of the advantages of voice 
recognition include convenience (it has high social acceptability), cost-effectiveness 
(there is no extra hardware required), and it is widely accessible (most devices are 
equipped with a microphone, for example). However, the disadvantages are that it can 
easily be spoofed (the voice is prone to spoofing, where an attacker can record a user’s 
voice and use the recording for authentication), there is a time cost (in order to verify a 
user's identity, the system may require some time), and accents may affect the result 
(voice recognition may not be able to recognize a user's voice who is not a native speaker 




Lastly, some users may not feel comfortable speaking aloud in public to verify 
their identity. Because of this, some users tend to use another authentication factor to 
prove their identity; for example, the user's location (i.e., somewhere a user is). 
1.1.6 Somewhere a User Is 
This type of authentication is based on a user’s location, and is known as 
geolocation. Although location may not always be considered a unique identifier of a 
user, it can be utilized to indicate if a remote adversary is attempting to perform some 
sort of malicious activity from a location that is not the typical location of the user. 
For example, suppose that a user usually accesses her bank account from home 
when she gets home from work. In this case, the bank’s remote authentication entity can 
use this information to establish a geolocation pattern based on the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address of her computer. If remote access is attempted from another country, for 
example, this may indicate a malicious action. Geolocation authentication is used by most 
banks, for example, to block wire transfers from overseas unless the user has informed 
the bank to approve any transfers from another geolocation ahead of time. This method of 
authentication is used not only by banks; many websites will not allow a user to gain 
access if the user’s location is not in the customary location. 
In summary, there are five elements of authentication that, together, comprise 
authentication credentials. These five elements include somewhere that a user is, 
something that a user possesses, something that a user is, something that a user knows, 
and something that a user does. A significant goal of this work is to introduce and utilize 
a sixth element: something that is in a user's environment.  One of the goals of this work 




infrastructure to prove a user’s identity without adding any additional burden on users of 
the system. Because there is no additional burden on the users, something that we believe 
is novel in our work, we call our system a zero-effort two-factor authentication (0E2FA) 
system. In the following section, the IEEE 802.11 infrastructure will be discussed, 
including how we plan to utilize it to enable our proposed method. 
 
1.2 Technical Background 
 
IEEE 802.11 refers to the most popular set of standards for wireless local area 
networks (WLAN) [8]. More commonly known as Wi-Fi, the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) adopted it as the first WLAN standard in 1997 [9]. The Wi-
Fi protocol links two or more devices using radio frequency wireless communication, and 
usually requires shared connections over access points [10]. The hardware that allows 
devices to connect with an access point is commonly called a Wi-Fi card, Wi-Fi device, 
Wi-Fi interface, or a station. Over its history, there have been several different revisions 
of the Wi-Fi standard (e.g., 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, 802.11n, and recently, 802.11ac 
and 802.11ad). These specifications differ in terms of speed, performance, and range 
[11]. 
WLAN has the ability to operate over bands of 2.4 GHz, 3.6 GHz, or five GHz. 
[12]. A band is the frequency range of the electromagnetic spectrum that is utilized to 
send a signal, and it is strictly regulated for specific use by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) [7]. The data transmission speed over Wi-Fi also varies based on the 
protocol revision, ranging from six Mbps in IEEE802.11a, all the way to 600 Mbps in 
802.11n. Wi-Fi bands are further divided into channels that allow various nearby devices 




likely to be subject to interference, however, as it is a popular “sweet spot” in terms of 
range and bandwidth (features that are inversely proportional). It is most commonly used 
by electronics applications such as Bluetooth, cordless phones, and wireless peripheral 
dongles, while also being emitted by some appliances such as microwave ovens. 
Unfortunately, this band allows for very few channels to be simultaneously usable 
without interference. Conversely, the five GHz band has 19 available channels and 
greater bandwidth at the cost of penetration potential and range. Devices using this band 
must have the ability to examine the load on each channel and choose the best one for 
minimizing interference. 
As mentioned in the previous section, this research aims to use IEE802.11 access 
point broadcast information to provide an additional means by which to authenticate 
users. Typically, a broadcast message comes in the form of a beacon frame, a type of 
management frame that is transmitted periodically by Wi-Fi access points for the purpose 
of establishing connections [13]. The beacon frame announces the existence of a network, 
allowing devices to find and identify the network, and subsequently to request access. It 
contains the information about the network needed to make the request [14]. The time 
between beacon frame broadcasts differs from network to network, but the broadcasts 
come at regular intervals [13]. The range within which a device may receive a beacon 
frame is defined as the basic service area (BSA). Figure 1-1 shows the structure of a 
beacon frame in IEEE 802.11 that consists of three sections: (1) the medium access 






Figure 1-1:  802.11 Beacon frame [16] 
 
 
1. MAC header: This header is comprised of multiple subsections, such as frame 
control, duration, address, and sequence control information. The header will also 
include quality of service (QoS is any technology that controls data traffic on a 
network [17]) data frames, and QoS control information, which is a 16-bit field 
[18]. In the proposed system, the MAC address (also known as the BSSID) will 
be used to verify that a user’s devices are co-located. More details will be 
provided further in this text. 
2. Frame body: The frame body is a field of variable length that contains 
information particular to the frame body type and subtype [17]. It is used to carry 
several pieces of information pertaining to the network that are needed by stations 
requesting access. The frame body consists of the following fields: 
a. Timestamp: The timestamp provides the timing synchronization function 




of all stations in the same BSA synchronized, and all stations should maintain 
a local TSF timer [17]. 
b. Beacon interval: This represents the number of time units between beacon 
transmissions, which can be used to determine the next time to check for 
incoming traffic. This is useful, for example, when devices go into power-
saving mode [19]. This information allows an access point to switch its Wi-Fi 
radio unit on and off several times per second to save power (usually in the 
form of a battery). For most access points, the beacon interval has a default 
value of 100 ms; however, it can be adjusted in most cases [19]. Access points 
must schedule their beacon transmission at the selected beacon interval; 
however, the transmission may suffer some delays while attempting to avoid a 
collision with the beacon frames broadcast by other devices [19]. 
c. Capability information: This information contains a number of subfields used 
to indicate connection requests or to advertise optional capabilities for those 
devices wishing to connect to a wireless LAN [19]. 
d. Service set identifier (SSID): The SSID is a unique identifier that acts as the 
name of a particular WLAN. It is utilized by clients to seek out a preferred 
network in order to establish a connection [20]. The SSID is sometimes 
known as the extended SSID (ESSID) [21]. For an additional layer of security 
through obfuscation, the user may choose to have the access point leave the 
SSID out of the beacon frame [20], although this does not necessarily prevent 




provided further in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.5 that explains how the proposed 
system utilizes the SSID to verify that a user’s devices are co-located. 
e. Supported rates: Each broadcasting access point supports connection speeds 
[19]. Stations can use this information to decide which access point is most 
suitable for a connection [19]. 
f. Parameter sets: This field specifies the signaling methods to be used, such as 
frequency hopping spread spectrum, direct sequence spread spectrum, etc. A 
beacon would include the appropriate signaling methods to adapt to the 
channel's condition and to achieve efficient data transmission [22]. 
g. Traffic indication map (TIM): Every beacon frame contains a list known as a 
TIM. A TIM is a list of all the stations that have buffered frames awaiting 
delivery at an access point [22]. 
3. FCS: This sequence is a 32-bit field that contains a cyclic redundancy check 
(CRC). The CRC is used to validate the integrity of received frames [18]. 
In this study, we aim to utilize the Wi-Fi broadcast messages and specifically 
selected information contained in the beacon frame to implement a 2FA system that 
requires no effort on the part of the user. Broadly, the latter characteristic is one 
important distinction that makes this work different and unique from others. For example, 
a user will not be required to receive and subsequently enter a code, or to confirm a login 
attempt using a mobile device. The beacon frame specifics are used to determine if two 
devices are in the same “environment.” Specifically, the SSID and BSSID are used 




The SSID is used to name a wireless network and can be up to 32 characters long. 
Both the client’s device (i.e., Wi-Fi card) and access point (e.g., router) must share the 
SSID. The SSID is broadcasted in an area to present the existence of the wireless 
network. Before linking with a specific wireless network, a device known as wireless 
network interface card (Wi-Fi NIC) must pair with the SSID of the access point. Figure 
1-2 shows an example of an SSID list that was scanned in a specific location (more 




Figure 1-2: A list of access points showing the SSID and signal strength of each 
 
 
The BSSID is a hardware identification number that uniquely identifies an access 
point. The format of the BSSID in a broadcasted message can be represented as a MAC 
address using any of the following formats [23]:  
1. 00:00:00:00:00:00,  
2. 00-00-00-00-00-00, or  




The first six-digits of the MAC address represents the manufacturer and is called 
the Organizational Unique Identifier (OUI). Below are some examples of well-known 
manufacturers [24]: 
1. CC:46:D6 - Cisco 
2. 3C:5A:B4 - Google, Inc. 
3. 00:9A:CD - Huawei Technologies Co., LTD 
The remaining six digits are a combination that is uniquely allocated to each Wi-




Figure 1-3: List of SSIDs (Network Name column) with their respective BSSIDs 
 
 
As any signal travels, it decays, or decreases in strength. This decay is relative to 
the transmitter and receiver, and is represented by the RSSI (Received Signal Strength 
Indicator). The RSSI that is measured at the receiver's antenna is a value that can be used 
to calculate the distance from the transmitter to the receiver. Thus, the RSSIs (expressed 
in dBm) perceived at the receiving station are consistent with the station location with 
reference to the transmitting access points. Figure 1-4 shows the beacon information and 
corresponding RSSI values received by a MacBook Pro that is monitoring beacon frames 
from several access points. This information was collected using the built-in wireless 




translates to a very small but positive number that corresponds to power on a logarithmic 
scale [25]. A negative dBm means a negative exponent is applied in power calculations 
(e.g., -10 dBm equates to 0.1 mW, -20 dBm equates to 0.01 mW, etc.) and represents a 




Figure 1-4: Beacon frame information for several access points 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the SSID and BSSID can be used as an indicator that a 
user’s devices are in the same physical location. The RSSI value is used to calculate the 
distance between a device and an access point (more details on this are provided in 
Chapter 3 Section 3.4.2). Both an SSID and BSSID are needed because if two access 
points have the same SSID, then the BSSID can be utilized to differentiate between them. 
This is because the BSSID is unique as explained previously in this text, and it is 
impossible for two access points to have the same BSSID (as explained previously in this 
section). Amongst the beacon frame’s characteristics, the SSID and BSSID were chosen 
to determine the location of a user’s devices because the SSID and BSSID are both 
unique identifiers of an access point. These two characteristics are also used when 
announcing the presence of the access point in an area which can then be used for the 




characteristics do not help to improve the proposed system’s accuracy (more details about 




Using the current IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, the proposed system implements a 
second layer of authentication and places no burden on users. Moreover, in this 
dissertation a zero-effort two-factor authentication system based on something that is in 
the user's environment (ambient access points) is proposed. In this research, data from the 
broadcast messages are utilized to implement the second authentication factor by 
determining whether two devices are in the same physical location, in a way that requires 
zero interaction from the user. 
The proposed solution aims to add an extra layer of authentication by finding 
something unique that is in a user’s environment; specifically, by utilizing information at 
ambient access points (a Wi-Fi footprint). This system depends on something that a user 
knows, something that a user owns, and something that is in the user’s environment – 
arguably the most significant contribution of this work. Primarily due to the proposed 
system removing the “weak link” from the second authentication factor, the proposed 
system facilitates the use of 2FA in more systems. 
 
1.4 Guide to Dissertation and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, authentication credentials were discussed. Furthermore, some 
examples of authentication credentials were introduced. Also, the relevant technical 
background was discussed. Chapter 2 discusses existing research in the field of 2FA, the 




relevant. Chapter 3 introduces the proposed system and discusses some of the challenges 
encountered during its development and address the shortcomings that have been 
mentioned in the various related works in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 evaluates different aspects 
of the proposed system. Moreover, the different factors and parameters that play a role in 
the proposed system's performance and security are analyzed. Chapter 5 outlines the 
design specifics of the proposed system and the challenges faced during the design 
process. Chapter 1 presents numerous experiments that were utilized to test the proposed 
system's design in various aspects. Chapter 6 summarizes the proposed system and 
discusses possible future directions. 
 
1.5 Peer Review 
 
Portions of the proposed system have been accepted and/or published at various 
conferences and in various journals or are currently being reviewed. Specifically, the 
results of experiment one (discussed in Chapter 5) were presented in 2020 3rd 
International Conference on Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS 2020) 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 2020 [26]. Also, the same results were developed and 
published for the IEEE Access journal [27]. In addition, a miniature version of the 
proposed system was submitted to two conferences and were accepted (i.e., IEEE-APS 
Topical Conference on Antennas and Propagation in Wireless Communications (APWC 
2020), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, Aug 2020 and The 7th IEEE International Conference on 
Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud 2020), Aug 2020, New York City, NY, 










In this chapter, we discuss existing research in the field of 2FA to differentiate 
these ideas from our proposed system. Furthermore, we discuss the weaknesses of these 
ideas and how our proposed system can address them where relevant. 
 
2.1 Related Works 
 
In this section, the relevant existing ideas in the field of 2FA are presented, 
ordered according to the technology used at the authentication phase. The systems in 
Section 2.1.1 depend on a OTP. Section 2.1.2 presents authentication methods that 
depend on a phone call. Section 2.1.3 presents 2FA systems that depend on radio 
frequency ID (RFID) technology, Section 2.1.4 presents 2FA systems that depend on 
Quick Response (QR) technology, Section 2.1.5 presents 2FA systems that depend on 
NFC technology, and Section 2.1.6 presents 2FA systems that depend on ambient sound 
authentication. 
2.1.1 Authentication Systems that Depend on a OTP 
An OTP is a password that is sent to a user's phone, an email, or that is displayed 
to a user for the purpose of adding an extra layer of security.  The OTP remains valid for 
a specific period of time [30]. This idea has been widely used in 2FA authentication 
systems to address vulnerabilities associated with traditional password-based 




In 2011, Yu and Brune proposed a 2FA scheme [32] entitled “No security by 
obscurity - why two-factor authentication should be based on an open design.” In the 
registration phase, the user selects from a list of OTPs that has been generated by an 
authentication entity. On the client side, software is installed to decrypt the OTP list to 
obtain the next valid OTP by submitting a valid username and password. In the login 
phase, a user submits the credential information. Subsequently, a sequence number is 
presented by the system that indicates which OTP in the list should be used. In the client 
software, the user enters the OTP along with a password that is designed to decrypt the 
OTP list in the registration phase. The software decrypts the OTP and displays it to the 
user. The user inserts the corresponding OTP, along with a user ID, within a predefined 
period of time in order to be authenticated. The authentication entity then checks the 
information and renders an authentication decision. The major security threat with this 
method is that there is a possible disclosure of the encrypted OTP list from the user’s 
side. For example, the user’s cellphone could be stolen or lost, and the user does not 
realize that this has happened. In this case, the OTP list could be copied or captured and 
used in an offline password guessing attack (an offline technique that an attacker attempts 
in order to discover a password by systematically trying every possible combination of 
numbers, letters, and symbols) which may lead to the attacker gaining access. In addition, 
although the system uses a strong encryption method (e.g., Twofish), there is still a 
weakness in which an attacker could decrypt the OTP during its period of validity by 
using the offline password guessing attack to break the encrypted password, and use it to 




In 2018, Al-Sahwan et al. presented an authentication protocol that depends on 
both the PassText mechanism and OTP techniques [33]. The PassText mechanism is 
essentially a meaningful text file that is presented to a user and replaces a password. 
During the registration phase, the user receives a PassText that must be modified by 
adding, deleting, or changing text, and that is stored on a remote authentication entity 
after it is encrypted with bcrypt and sha256 [33]. The user logs in to the system with a 
username only, and then the user is prompted with the original text file. The user then has 
to apply the same exact modification to the original file. After the user performs the 
modification, the authentication entity compares the hash of the submitted PassText with 
the stored PassText hash. A OTP is subsequently sent to the user's email or mobile device 
number chosen during the registration phase. In order to gain access, the user must enter 
the OTP correctly before the session ends or user access will not be granted. A weakness 
of this system is that a user can forget the PassText modifications.  In this case, the user 
will need to reset it. According to Al-Sahwan et al, this can be done by sending a OTP to 
the user’s cellphone number or email address. If the user enters the OTP correctly, s/he 
will be able to enter modifications on the original file. In this case, an attacker may 
request to reset modifications where the OTP could be easily obtained by using a 
phishing attack, for example. Moreover, remembering the modifications and waiting for 
the OTP to be sent is a significant inconvenience for users. 
2.1.2 Authentication Systems that Depend on a Phone Call 
A phone call is a connection between two parties over a telephone network. The 
first phone call was made on March 10, 1876, when Alexander Graham Bell called his 




With a call, we can prove the identity of a user either with a voiceprint or a phone 
number. Because of this some authentication methods have used phone calls on 
authentication systems, as we discuss below. 
In 2013, Fujii and Tsuruoka proposed a 2FA system called SV-2FA that used a 
one-time, disposable phone number along with an oath text sent via SMS to authenticate 
a user with voiceprint match [35]. During the registration phase, users must fill out a 
special form giving their ID, cellphone number, and an official signature or seal, and mail 
it to the organization managing the authentication entity. After the operator processes the 
user’s information, the authentication entity sends a text message to the user’s phone that 
includes an oath text and the one-time phone number, which can be called to proceed 
with the authentication process. Here is an example of the text message sent to a user: 
“We are going to begin the process written in the oath text below. If you consent to this, 
please call <phone_number> and read it within 45 seconds. OATH TEXT: ‘I, <name>, 
register my voiceprint to <entity>. Today is <date>.’ ” [35]. For this process, the user 
calls the one-time phone number and reads aloud the oath text, the voiceprint of which is 
recorded along with a timestamp, an ID, and the originating phone number. The 
registration is then completed. The next time the user logs into the registered system, an 
SMS text message that contains a one-time return phone number as well as an oath text is 
sent to the user’s cellphone number. Subsequently, the client must call the one-time 
phone number and speak the message back to the authentication entity. The 
authentication entity records the spoken oath text, along with the session number, for 
comparison with the user’s stored voiceprint. If the recorded voiceprint matches the one 




attempt will fail. One weakness of this method is that personally identifying information 
must be written on a form and physically mailed to the authentication entity’s operator. 
During transit, this information could be exposed to postal workers or be stolen by a third 
party. Furthermore, the user is required to verbally read the oath message, which would 
likely be on an unencrypted line that could cause a user’s voiceprint to be recorded and 
maliciously used by an attacker. In addition, there is the potential for a message to be 
delayed due to network congestion. After all, most consumers (99% of Americans, 
according to a recent Pew study [12]) own mobile phones capable of SMS; furthermore, 
in large cities, SMS messages often get delayed by a significant length of time [36]. 
Finally, this method has considerable requirements in terms of user interaction (writing, 
mailing, talking, etc.). 
In 2015, Sodhi proposed a method that used a dropped call as a 2FA [37]. During 
the registration stage, the user provides a cellphone number to an authentication entity 
providing the requested service. When the user attempts to authenticate to the 
authentication entity, it asks the user for the registered phone number. If the entry 
matches what is stored in the authentication entity's database, the system selects an 
available phone number randomly from the database and sends it to the user's phone as a 
OTP. On the client side, the user is prompted to make a dropped phone call to the given 
phone number within a specific time. At that point, the authentication entity can receive a 
dropped call through the chosen number within a specific period of time—and 
subsequently makes an authentication decision. This scheme is subject to a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack, where an attacker could keep a mobile phone ringing for an 




possible that a malicious entity could initiate a phone call from that number to an 
arbitrary phone number (i.e., to impersonate the user, an attacker could attempt to make a 
dropped phone call to the selected arbitrary number that the system has chosen). 
Moreover, the telephony network can be spoofed, which means that an attacker could 
send an arbitrary phone number to the phones in the authentication entity's phone pool as 
the caller’s identity to potentially gain knowledge of all of the phone numbers used by the 
server in the authentication system. 
2.1.3 Authentication Systems that Depend on RFID Technology  
RFID is a wireless communication technology that is used to identify uniquely 
tagged objects or people [38]. At present, RFID is used to authenticate users and prevent 
fraud or unauthorized access to an information system. We discuss relevant works in this 
area that use RFID to authenticate users.  
In 2017, Mathew and Divya published an authentication system that uses RFID to 
gain access to a building, a room, or an office as a second factor of authentication [39]. 
To open a door, a user must place their RFID tag in contact with a reader; in turn, the 
reader retrieves the tag information. On the authentication entity side, if the information 
matches what is in the database, it generates a OTP and sends it to the client side. The 
user opens an application that has been installed previously in a mobile device to read the 
OTP. Once the user enters the received OTP correctly in the door’s keypad, the user 
gains access. In the proposed idea, the authentication entity is trusted by users most of the 
time [40]. So, this system is subject to phishing attacks as the generated OTP would be 
easy to obtain. For example, an attacker can impersonate the authentication entity (i.e., 




an email) and can request the user to authenticate himself. If the user does so, the attacker 
will subsequently receive the OTP and can use it to gain access [40]. The proposed idea 
requires hardware parts that must be installed in every door, which would cost money, 
time, and effort. To open a door, a user must insert an RFID tag, wait for a OTP to be 
sent, and subsequently enter it on the door's keypad. Because of this, the system is not 
convenient for most users (i.e., it requires user interaction – something that we wish to 
avoid in our proposed system). Moreover, the system requires power and may not always 
function properly, which could leave a door completely locked and inaccessible or 
potentially remaining in the open position.  
In 2017, Tombeng and Laluyan published an authentication system that requires 
implanting a RFID tag into a human hand [41]. This security system works by replacing 
the mechanical lock system with RFID technology. In their work, it was implemented for 
access control of motorcycles [31]. A user first implants an RFID card in his/her body 
using a sterile implant kit. Then, the user places the implanted RFID tag close to an RFID 
reader that has been installed on a motorcycle. A microcontroller receives the information 
from the RFID reader, validates the RFID ID tag, and provides alerts in the form of LED 
lights and a sounding buzzer if the validation is successful. The microcontroller 
simultaneously instructs the electrical system to start the motorcycle engine. The major 
weaknesses of this system are privacy concerns and health issues. The privacy concerns 
are that every RFID chip contains a unique identifying number for each individual that 
could be linked to personal information. Moreover, installing or replacing the RFID 




An implanted RFID is also incompatible with strong magnetic medical equipment, which 
could prevent users from using medical equipment when necessary. 
2.1.4 Authentication Systems that Depend on QR Technology  
A QR code is a type of matrix barcode or two-dimensional barcode that contains 
information that is readable by smart devices [42]. In 1994, the QR code was created by 
Toyota, and was used to track inventory of vehicle parts [42]. Today, QR codes are used 
in many other fields such as commercial tracking, entertainment, in-store product 
labeling, and in applications that are designed for mobile device users [42]. In the 
following section, we will discuss two systems that use QR codes to authenticate users.  
In 2016, Rodrigues, Chaudhari, et. al proposed a QR code-based scheme [43]. 
Their method uses QR technology to create a second authentication factor. In order to 
create a user profile and store it in the system, users must first visit a remote 
authentication entity (usually a website) and submit their full name, email address, 
password, and the unique international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) number 
associated with their mobile phone. Subsequently, the remote authentication entity 
generates a QR code using the IMEI information and a random four-digit code. Users 
then use a special application installed on their mobile phone to scan the QR code and 
input the received string into the remote authentication entity to verify the information 
and complete the registration phase. To later authenticate, users perform the same QR 
code-scan and string-input procedure. If the entered string from the scanned QR code 
matches the information at the authentication entity, users are successfully authenticated. 
Again, this method requires a certain amount of effort on the part of the user, both in the 




there is also the problem of interception, as the QR code is displayed on the user’s 
monitor during the entire process, and can be read from a distance. A user may be subject 
to an impersonation attack, in which an attacker can steal the QR code from the user’s 
monitor during registration or authentication [36]. With the exposed QR code, the 
attacker could potentially obtain the user’s IMEI with a QR code reader (which is now 
standard on most mobile devices), and then use it to impersonate the user via spoofing. 
This would be difficult to discover and rectify in a timely manner [45].  
In 2016, a 2FA scheme, called 2FMA-NetBank, was proposed by Pratama and 
Prima to serve internet banking [46]. In this work a user enters a username and password 
during the login phase on the login web page of the proposed system. The remote 
authentication entity verifies the input credential information by comparing it with 
information previously stored in a database during the registration phase. If the username 
and password are correct, the authentication entity then generates a random value as a 
challenge using the authentication entity’s private key. The remote authentication entity 
then combines this random value along with the user’s IMEI to compute a “response” 
with the user’s public key to encrypt it and store it in the system’s database. Afterward, 
the authentication entity converts the digitally signed value and encrypted challenge to a 
QR code to display to the user on a web page. Using an application on the user’s mobile 
device that was installed during the registration phase, the user scans the QR code to 
decrypt it using the authentication entity’s public key. The digitally signed random value 
is verified with the user’s private key. By using a software token that is installed on the 
user’s mobile device, a combination of the random value and IMEI is computed to find 




system web page. The remote authentication entity compares the entered response with 
the stored response in the database to either authorize or deny access. The weaknesses in 
the proposed system are that the QR code is displayed to the user on the internet web 
page. Consequently, it could be relatively easy to obtain from the screen or from the 
user’s computer if the computer were compromised, for example. Because the software 
token is installed on the client side in order to decrypt the QR code during authentication, 
an attacker could gain that information if they were able to compromise the user’s mobile 
device. 
2.1.5 Authentication Systems that Depend on NFC Technology  
NFC is a short-range wireless communication that allows smart devices to 
exchange data either by touching, tapping, or coming within a certain range of proximity 
[47]. In order for two smart devices using NFC technology to exchange information, both 
devices must be tuned to the same radio frequency. Moreover, both devices must be 
within operating range, which is typically between three to five cm [48]. Due to the short 
range of NFC, its use as a way to authenticate users is relevant. We review two such 
systems below.  
In 2017, Hufstetler, Ramos, and Wang proposed a 2FA system that works by 
scanning an authorized NFC tag [49]. The method relies on pGina, an open-source 
credential provider replacement that allows developers to create plugins for alternate 
methods of authentication and to allow access to a machine that is running a Windows 
operating system. Moreover, an NFC tag must be attached to the user’s system and be 
configured with pGina. During login, the user is asked to type a predefined passcode into 




simultaneously holding an authorized NFC tag up to the reader. The entered information 
and the scanned NFC tag are sent to the plugin to check if they match the ones registered 
during setup. Depending on the outcome, pGina either denies or grants the user access to 
the remote system. Unfortunately, there are several weaknesses with this method – 
primarily due to the wireless nature of NFC [50]. Eavesdropping can occur during NFC 
communication if the attacker is close enough to the user’s device [51] [52]. NFC does 
not have any type of safeguard against the possibility of eavesdropping [52]. Also, 
because every NFC tag has a built-in unique ID, this ID can be spoofed, captured, and/or 
copied, as the ID is not encrypted. This security may not be sufficient to protect a user’s 
information [53] [54] [9]. Lastly, this system requires significant user interaction as well 
as a physical device (NFC tag) to keep track of.  This is not convenient for users of the 
system (which is a weakness that we consider significant, and that we wish to address in 
our proposed method).  
Another system that uses NFC, published in 2019, authenticates a user at an ATM 
machine by having the user swipe a mobile device in front of an NFC reader [55]. During 
the registration phase, the user installs a relevant application. Through the application, the 
user enters a username and a default PIN, and sends a registration request to an 
authentication entity. The remote authentication entity responds by sending a text 
message with a OTP to the user’s cellphone number. The user types the OTP into the 
application and submits it to the authentication entity for verification. After the OTP is 
validated, the user must select a new PIN and submit it through the application. In the 
meantime, the application collects information specific to the mobile device, such as 




information in the same message with the new PIN to be stored in the authentication 
entity's database. In the authentication phase, the user sends a username and password 
through the application to the authentication entity. After successfully validating the 
credential information, the authentication entity responds to the application with a OTP 
that is valid for only one transaction within a specific time; furthermore, the OTP is 
invisible to the user and internally stored in the application. When the user swipes his/her 
mobile device in front of the ATM NFC reader for authentication, the stored OTP is 
transferred from the application to the authentication entity. If the scanned OTP matches 
the one stored on the authentication entity, the transaction is successful; if not, the user is 
rejected. The weakness in this system is that the security in NFC channels is not 
sufficient enough to protect user information because all NFC channels are unencrypted 
and can be spoofed, captured, or copied [53] [54] [9]. 
2.1.6 Authentication Systems that Depend on Ambient Sound  
Ambient sound refers to any sound that serves as background noise at a given 
location. Because every location has its own unique ambient sound, several researchers 
have utilized sound to authenticate users.  
QuickAuth, a method proposed by Zhu, Yu, and Pei in 2016, depends on the 
ambient sound around the user during authentication [56]. When a user attempts to login 
to the QuickAuth authentication entity with a username, a pre-installed application that is 
running on both the user’s mobile device and computer are automatically triggered with a 
remote request. The applications open each device’s built-in microphone and 
synchronously records the room’s ambient sound. If the recorded ambient sounds 




the login fails. This system may not fit all environments because it depends on an ability 
to listen to ambient sound. Nearby audio may be recorded, including any personal 
conversations occurring in the background, which could lead to security vulnerabilities 
and infringe on the privacy of individuals. The user may also be unable to find an 
environment with noise levels appropriate for the authentication system to reliably work 
[44]. If there is a single loud source of noise (e.g., a television, nearby construction, 
music, etc.), it may also be possible to trick the system into thinking that two mobile 
devices are in the same location [57].  
Similar to the previous example in which ambient audio captured simultaneously 
by two devices was used, Wang, Zhu, Yan, and Wang published a system called Sound 
Auth that generates random, near-ultrasound noise for more accurate comparison [58]. In 
this system, a user initiates a login request on a remote authentication entity, and both 
devices begin recording. Both the background noise and the near-ultrasound noise that is 
generated by the user’s web browser are recorded for the duration of the login procedure. 
When the recording is completed, each device sends the recorded audio to the 
authentication entity for comparison to determine whether to accept or deny access. As 
with the previous example, gathering ambient sound information can be inconvenient. 
The possibility of overhearing important, private information could lead to significant 
security vulnerabilities or infringe on the privacy of users [59]. 
 
2.2 Conclusion 
In the related works discussed, each introduced a method for implementing 
2FA/DFA. Weaknesses were discussed that will be resolved in our proposed system. 




proposed system. Taking account of the weaknesses of existing research, in the next 
chapter we propose a direction that has the potential to address these shortcomings and 









THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
 
 
In this chapter, we introduce our proposed system, a zero-effort 2FA system 
(0E2FA). To be clear, this chapter outlines the proposed system at a high level, primarily 
defining goals, constraints, components, and so on. We discuss the portions of the 
proposed system in much more detail in subsequent chapters. We also discuss some of 
the challenges encountered during its development and address the shortcomings that 
have been mentioned in the various related works in the previous chapter. 
 
3.1  The Proposed System’s Architecture 
 
Conventional access control systems rely on users’ identities to determine 
whether to grant access to requested resources – or not. In the proposed system, the 
granting of access is determined by the physical location of a user and his/her two 
devices (a login machine – such as a desktop computer – and a mobile device – such as a 
mobile phone). In fact, access is contingent upon characteristics in the user's immediate 
environment; specifically, characteristics of nearby IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi devices. The 
second layer of security in the proposed system requires the two devices that belong to a 
user to be in the same physical location (more details are provided in Section 3.3.5). For 
example, if a user wishes to access an information system using the proposed system, not 
only is user identity required, but the user’s two devices must also be in the same 




The proposed system requires a combination of the users’ identity and 
characteristics in the users’ immediate environment (specifically, characteristics that are 
captured by the user's two devices) to decide whether to grant or revoke access to the 
system. 
The proposed system is also responsible for registering and validating the user's 
credentials before authorizing access to requested resources. The registration and 
authentication process is shown as: 
1. A user submits his/her identification details (e.g., a username) to the 
authentication entity through a login machine (e.g., a desktop, a laptop, etc.).  
2. The proposed system then responds with a request for additional credentials from 
the user to prove their identity. These credentials rely on a number of factors only 
known to the user and are used by the system to prove the user’s identity. In this 
study, the proposed system depends on two user-defined factors to authenticate 
the user. The first factor is a description of an item only known to the user (i.e., 
what the user knows), while the second factor is a description of the user’s 
environment – specifically, a Wi-Fi footprint.  
3. The user sends the credential information, which includes data about the user’s 
environment. 
4. The proposed system verifies the received credential information and determines 
if the two devices are in the same physical location. Based on this information, a 
decision of whether to grant or deny the user access to requested resources is 





The registration and authentication process of the proposed system at a high level 




Figure 3-1: The proposed system registration and authentication processes 
 
 
3.2 The Proposed System’s Design Specifics 
 
In this section, the proposed system’s design is presented. Moreover, the system 
was designed to overcome the weaknesses of other systems noted in the previous chapter. 
These will also be discussed. The proposed system utilizes IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), which 
meets various design requirements; specifically, it is inexpensive and broadly available 
[60]. This results in a 2FA system that can be deployed immediately in virtually any 
existing setting. It is also intrinsically scalable, which makes it usable in today's 
environment. 
3.2.1 Requiring Zero-Effort to Implement Second Layer of Authentication 
The objective of this research is to design a zero-effort 2FA system that uses the 
signals broadcast by Wi-Fi access points as the second authentication factor – without 
requiring user intervention (which directly addresses user convenience). As mentioned in 
the technical background section, each access point periodically broadcasts a unique 
beacon frame to all network interface devices within range. In the proposed system, both 




nearby access points and send this information to the authentication entity which uses it 
to authenticate the user. The principal benefit of collecting embedded information from 
the beacon frames is that a wireless client can read and process the embedded information 
without necessarily being connected to the corresponding access point (e.g., for network 
access).  
In the proposed system, IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) is used as the medium because of its 
ubiquity. After all, wireless networks have been continually growing in popularity and 
can be found nearly everywhere [60]. In addition, similar to several of the systems 
mentioned in the previous chapter, devices that have Wi-Fi capabilities (such as mobile 
devices) are readily available for use as challenge tools in authentication systems because 
almost every internet user in the world owns one. As of 2018, according to the Pew 
Research Center, 96%of Americans own a smartphone, and 81% of them use their 
smartphones as the primary method for online access. This is especially common among 
younger adults [1]. In addition, nearly three quarters of American adults own desktops or 
laptops, while approximately half own tablets [1].  
3.2.2 Verification Processes 
The proposed system is a type of access control system. Access control is a 
security technique that provides access to a place or a resource based on selective 
restrictions that have been described by some administering entity. As an access control 
system, the proposed system manages identification, authentication, and authorization 
(see Figure 3-2).  
Identification is a logical entity that is used to prove a user’s identity on a system. 




type in a username using relevant applications (e.g., the login machine and mobile device 
applications) that are used as the means by which a user is identified.  
Authentication verifies a user in relation to a provided identity. This stage can be 
executed when a user further provides a correct password, for example (i.e., one that is 
associated with the provided username).  
Authorization is an act that validates data according to a predefined mechanism 
and, based on the result, either gives permission or not. Here, it is performed by the 
proposed system’s authentication entity, which compares the information received from 
two devices (something that is in the user’s environment): the one used to attempt the 




Figure 3-2: Verification processes 
 
 
3.2.3 The Proposed System's Components  
 
The proposed system requires three components: (1) a remote authentication 
entity (which could include the users' requested resources); (2) a login machine (e.g., a 
laptop, desktop, etc.); (3) a mobile device (e.g., a cellphone).  
The authentication entity can be local or remote with respect to the network. The 
local authentication entity can be in a user’s local area network (LAN); the remote 
authentication entity can be on the internet or some other wide area network (WAN), for 




location as the authentication entity or not (i.e., this characteristic does not matter). The 
proposed system’s authentication entity is effectively the “brain” that implements the 
proposed system and controls access to requested resources.  
In the proposed system a user logs in, and the system automatically collects what 
is in the user’s environment (i.e., the Wi-Fi footprint that this device “sees”). A mobile 
device therefore becomes an authentication device. Using the mobile device, the system 
authenticates the user’s identity and also collects what is in the user’s environment 
(again, the Wi-Fi footprint that this device “sees”). 
3.2.4 Database Design 
In general, a database is a systematic collection of data that is stored and 
organized electronically on a computer system. The proposed system requires a database 
to store and retrieve information when needed. The proposed system receives information 
in a bag form (more details are provided in Section 3.4.1) then stores the information in a 
relational database. This makes it easy to find specific information and also to sort 






Figure 3-3: A simplified Entity Relationship (ER) diagram of the relational database 
used for the proposed system. 
 
 
In the proposed system’s database there are five tables, and each table has a set of 
fields. The User table contains the information of users (e.g., id, name, username, 








The mobile device information table contains the mobile device information of 
registered users (e.g., user id, IMEI, device id, and session status (more details are 








The Mobile Data and Login Machine tables contain data that is collected by both 
of the user’s devices (e.g., user id, scan time, SSID and BSSID of every access point in 
the area – the Wi-Fi footprint, and RSSI value (i.e., that is in the table called level)) as 








The Overlapping table contains the overlapping access points between a user's 
login machine and mobile device (e.g., user id, SSID and BSSID of the overlapping 
access points in the area, and RSSI value of the mobile device, and the RSSI value of the 










Together, the tables in the relational database allow the authentication entity to 
manage users and their access to requested resources. 
3.2.5 Determining the Location of a User’s Devices 
The proposed system utilized only SSID, BSSID, and RSSI to determine a user’s 
location because (1) Using less will decrease the proposed system’s accuracy. In Chapter 
5 Section 5.1, it was determined that the RSSI readings were not consistent and also 
using RSSI values alone does not provide enough information when trying to determine a 
user’s location. Regarding the SSID, there is a possibility that two access points contain 
the same SSID. Therefore, the BSSID is included because it is a unique identifier of an 
access point. Although it is possible that two access points have the same BSSID (e.g., 
through spoofing of the MAC address), this is very rare.; (2) Utilizing more will not 
increase the proposed system’s accuracy as it was determined in Chapter 5 Section 5.2. 
The proposed system is intended to be a zero-interaction system such that a user 
does not need to intervene during the authentication processes (other than providing an 
identity and the first authentication factor – such as a password). This model is unique in 
that it grants access only when the two devices are determined to be in the same vicinity. 




obtain the same Wi-Fi characteristics in the environment (e.g., SSID, BSSID, RSSI), an 
assertion of co-location can be made. This allows the system to remove what we believe 
to be a significant “weak link” from other 2FA systems: user inconvenience. Specifically, 
this allows a user to log in with the benefits of 2FA, but without the usual hassle involved 
with it (e.g., manually typing in a PIN, phrase, or physical key-based second factor). 
Most users are familiar with and unencumbered by SFA, making the initial typing of the 
username and password the only action that they are required to perform. We believe that 
users will find this method as convenient as SFA, which would encourage its use and 
enable deployment.  
Verifying that both devices are in the same physical location can be done using 
information extracted from the Wi-Fi footprints provided by the user's devices. The 
presence of similar information from all nearby Wi-Fi access points acts as the first layer 
of location verification. From there, calculations using RSSI values revise the distance 
between each device and the access point in the area. Finally, these measurements are 
compared to determine if both devices are in the same physical location. Based on this 




In this section, we describe the operation of the proposed system that takes place 
in two phases: (1) the registration phase; and (2) the login and authentication phase. 
Because the proposed method utilizes ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi access points, it can 
be easily and inexpensively implemented [60]. Without requiring any interaction from the 





1. The login machine application: When a user is finished with the registration 
phase, the login machine must have a custom application installed. The login 
machine application is used to attempt a login to the remote authentication service 
as shown in Figure 3-8. Through it, the user's computer (or similar device) 
collects received signals from different access points in the area and sends them to 




Figure 3-8: Login machine application 
 
 
2. Mobile device application: A user has to download the proposed system’s mobile 
device application during the registration phase (see Figure 3-9). Through the 
application, the user is able to activate their account (see Figure 3-10). Because 
the proposed system is intended to require zero interaction on the part of the 
users, the mobile device’s application that automatically launches and manages 




phase. This application will automatically scan and collect data from surrounding 
Wi-Fi access points for authentication requests. The application ultimately sends 















3. The authorization entity: The authorization entity receives data in a Bag form 
(details of this are provided in the following section) from users and stores this in 
a relational database. Data received from users during the authentication phase is 
utilized in order to make the decision to either grant or deny access to the 
requested resources. 
3.3.1 Communication Overview 
As shown in Figure 3-11, the proposed system is set up in a client-server 
architecture, with arrows indicating the direction of communication. The user’s devices 
(mobile device and personal computer) require network access to communicate with the 




Figure 3-11: Communication system overview 
 
 
The mobile device can be connected to the authentication entity either through a 




device) can be connected to the authentication entity via Wi-Fi, Ethernet, or similar. The 
broadcast messages of access points in the area can be detected by network interface 
devices without necessarily establishing communication with the access points (i.e., the 
network devices simply need to monitor wireless broadcast messages). The 
communication between the authentication entity and the user's computer is a two-way 
communication (i.e., from the authentication entity to the computer—and vice versa). 
This communication occurs over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which is an 
application layer protocol that is used as a request-response protocol between a client and 
the authentication entity.  
The communication between the authentication entity and the mobile device is 
also a two-way communication (i.e., from the mobile device to the authentication 
entity—and vice versa). This communication also occurs over HTTP by utilizing the 
Apache HttpClient library, which is a transfer library that resides in the mobile device 
application and handles sending and receiving HTTP messages between a client and 
authentication entity. 
When a user submits credential information to the authentication entity through 
the login machine, the credential information travels across the internet in a form of a 
network packet (i.e., a unit of data that flows from a source to a destination). After 
verifying the user’s credential information, the authentication entity will then proceed to 
change the user's status to an active state within the database. The devices will then be 
instructed to collect the beacon frames within an area of each device as soon as this user's 
status flag is set to active. The mobile device application will continuously check the 




a background process that is initialized once the user has been authenticated. This 
background process is in constant contact with the authentication entity to check that the 
user is still authenticated and active while also not requiring the application to be visibly 
running. Then both devices send the requested information (i.e., Wi-Fi footprint, RSSI 
values, etc.) back to the authentication entity after packing them for transmission. The 
requested information will be grouped in a Bag, which is a set of n tuples (i.e., an ordered 
list of n fields) where n is the number of access points in an area. 
𝐵𝑎𝑔 = {𝐴𝑃1, 𝐴𝑃2, …… , 𝐴𝑃𝑛} 𝑛 ≥   1                        (Eq. 3-1) 
In the proposed system, each tuple is made of three fields that contain the data 







 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒1 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷1, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷1,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼1}
 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒2 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷2, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷2,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼2}
⋮
⋮
 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑛 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑛}
                        (Eq. 3-2) 
The login machine’s application receives a decision from the authentication entity 
to authenticate and authorize the user as discussed earlier. Note that a discussion of the 
communication security and how the beacon information is structured appears later in 
this text. 
In the proposed system, the authentication entity is effectively the controller, in 
that after it receives the data from the client side, all operations are controlled and 
implemented by the authentication entity. It is in charge of verifying the credential 
information of the user. Furthermore, it hosts the various user profiles – which, if desired, 
could be located on an entirely separate database server behind a firewall (i.e., a network 




outbound traffic, port information, and type of traffic, for the purposes of additional 
security. Lastly, the authentication entity is configured with the required access policies, 
and based on them, a decision to authenticate and grant permission to access requested 
resources is made. 
3.3.2 Implementation  
The proposed system consists of an authentication entity that is configured with 
an access policy. At the other end are the client-side applications, which are designed to 
collect the beacon frames broadcast by Wi-Fi access points in the area, and subsequently 
submit them to the authentication entity. Only some of the information within the beacon 
frame is utilized to authenticate and authorize the user at the authentication entity. Figure 





Figure 3-12: Overview of proposed system  
 
 
1. A user requests access to resources at the authentication entity and submits login 




that is installed during the registration phase. The authentication entity 
immediately verifies the received credential information (i.e., by running a hash 
function on the backend for a user’s password then comparing the username and 
hashed password with ones that were setup and stored in the database during the 
registration phase). 
2. Every access point in the area periodically broadcasts its own beacon frame. After 
verifying the user’s credential information, the authentication entity instructs both 
devices to collect their respective Wi-Fi footprint measure the RSSI value of 
every presented access point (more details are provided in Section 3.4.1). The 
authentication entity then triggers the mobile device application when the 
verification of the credentials is successful (more details are provided in Section 
3.4.1). Both devices send the requested information (e.g., Wi-Fi footprint, RSSI 
values, etc.) back to the authentication entity (more details are provided in Section 
3.4.1). 
3. The authentication entity receives and stores the records in a relational database 
(more details are provided in Section 3.3.4 and 3.4.1). 
4. From the data provided, the authentication entity generates a list of overlapping 
access points (those detectable by both devices) by checking the SSID and BSSID 
of each (more details are provided in Section 3.3.5). This list will be used for all 
authentication steps from here on. As mentioned in the previous section the data is 
sent to the authentication entity in a Bag. In this phase, the authentication entity 
receives two bags (one from the login machine (𝐵𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒) and the other 










 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒1 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷1, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷1,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼1}
 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒2 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷2, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷2,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼2}
⋮
⋮
 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑛 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑛}







 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒1 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷1, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷1,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼1}
 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒2 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷2, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷2,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼2}
⋮
⋮
 𝑇𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑛 = {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛, 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑛,  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑛}
                 (Eq. 3-4) 
Then the authentication entity determines the overlapping access points by 
comparing the 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑖 from the two bags. The authentication entity verifies 
that both devices are in the same location (more details are provided in Section 3.3.5), 
checking the list of overlapping access points. Figure 3-13 shows an example of a list of 




Figure 3-13: An example of a list of overlapping access points. 
 
 
5. The RSSI readings are then analyzed using Equation 3-1 to estimate the distance 
between the user’s two devices and every access point “seen” in the area.  
Equation 3-1 is the log-distance path loss model that predicts a path loss of a 
signal inside a building over a distance. It is used in the proposed system to 




𝑃𝐿𝑙𝑜𝑔 = 𝑃𝐿0 + 10 𝛾 𝑙𝑜𝑔10
𝑑
𝑑0
                               (Eq. 3-5) 
where 
𝑃𝐿𝑙𝑜𝑔 is the transmitted power (i.e., 20) minus the received power (RSSI value) 
𝑃𝐿𝑙𝑜𝑔 = 𝑃𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑟𝑥                                   (Eq. 3-6)   
𝑃𝐿0 is the path loss in dBm (PL means that there is a reduction in power strength 
as a signal travels through space). 
𝑃𝐿0 = 20𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (
4𝜋𝑑0
𝜆
)                              (Eq. 3-7) 
𝜆 is the operating wavelength in meters (e.g., for 2.4 GHz is approximately equal 
0.125 meters and for five GHz is approximately equal 0.06 meters),  
𝛾 is the path loss exponent (PLE) in dBm (PLE is a parameter in wireless 
communications that represents the propagation of fading channels).  
𝑑0 is the reference distance between the transmitting and receiving antenna in 
meters (usually equal to one meter). 
For example, if the RSSI value was -35 dBm the distance between the device and 
the access point is calculated as: 
20 − (−35) = 20 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (
4𝜋 ∗ 1
0.125




                                         55 = 40.46 +  27 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝒅                 
                       55 −  40.46 = 27 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝒅  
                                   14.54 = 27 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝒅 
                                       𝒅 = 10
14.54
27   




6. The distance between an access point and the user’s devices is used to refine the 
determination of whether the two devices are in the same physical location or in a 
neighboring physical location (more details are provided in Section 3.3.5). Figure 
3-14 shows an example of the distances (in meters) between a user’s devices (i.e., 





Figure 3-14: An example of the distances between a user’s devices and four access 
points which are identified by red boxes. 
 
 
7. A decision is made to allow or deny access to the user based on the shared 
location and proximity of the two devices (more details are provided in Section 
3.3.5). Figure 3-15 shows an example that the user has been successfully 






Figure 3-15: A diagnostics screen for testing purposes. 
 
 
The authentication entity instructs the user’s devices to collect what is in the 
user’s environment (i.e., SSID, BSSID, and RSSI value) and uses the collected 
information to authenticate the user (more details are provided in Section 3.4.1). A set of 
rules below guides this authentication process: 
a. There exists at least a predefined number of overlapping access points detected by 
both devices; and 
b. The estimated distance from the devices to all access points falls within a 
predefined range. However, if there are no overlapping access points, the user can 
gain access using a one-time login feature that will be discussed in Chapter 4 
Section 4.3.2. 
Because the proposed method utilizes ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi access 
points, it can be easily and inexpensively implemented in a real-world environment [60]. 
The proposed system allows flexibility with respect to authentication and authorization as 




system requires no more intervention than merely entering the username and password as 
usual in a SFA system. The proposed system therefore has the convenience of SFA with 
the security of DFA, without the vulnerabilities associated with only having SFA and the 
inconvenience of typical DFA systems. 
 
3.4 The Proposed System's Features 
 
A study of the existing 2FA systems from different perspectives was performed 
prior to the start of the design phase of our system. Both the positive and negative aspects 
of each system was considered in order to design a novel 2FA system that addresses the 
various shortcomings mentioned in Chapter 2. As a result, the proposed system is 
effective as a DFA system that reduces impact on users. Moreover, it has several 




Security is one of the most essential features of the proposed system. In general, 
security is an approach to protect valuable possessions against potential threats, either 
visible or invisible. In information systems, security is a defense technique for digital 
information against either internal or external malicious activities. Security is 
implemented in three forms: (1) detection, (2) prevention, and (3) response to threats. In 
the proposed system, all three forms were considered to ensure that it is resistant to 





3.4.2 User Convenience 
User convenience typically describes how a product or service is conducive to 
achieving user satisfaction. In the security area, the relationship between security and 
user convenience is an inverse relationship. In other words, as security increases, user 
convenience often decreases—and vice versa. In this work, the various aspects of the 
proposed system were carefully designed with the aim of balancing user convenience 
with system security. This is further discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.4.3 Flexibility 
A system is flexible if it can accept one or more modifications to achieve a 
desired fit or configuration. For example, the proposed system has the ability to adjust the 
number of access points that an administrator may desire the system to use, among other 
things. Using more access points may provide a more accurate determination of the co-
location of a user's devices. A discussion of this, including more details, is presented in 
Chapter 4. In this chapter, we merely layout the intended characteristics of the proposed 
system. 
3.4.4 Cost-Effectiveness 
The term cost-effective means that a system has value when its benefits are 
compared with its cost. The relationship between a system’s costs and benefits may be a 
positive relationship, where if one goes up, the second follows—or the relationship may 
be negative, which is the inverse. In the proposed system, what a user possesses (i.e., a 
mobile device and a larger computer such as a desktop or a laptop) and what is in the 
user’s environment (i.e., the Wi-Fi footprint) are used. Since the proposed system makes 




additional costs incurred to implement it. In addition, no specialized hardware needs to be 
installed or used. Ultimately, the proposed system is relatively easy to deploy and 
maintain. 
3.4.5 Logging in Using a Login Machine 
There is a case where the user may not have the authentication device in 
possession (e.g., the device was forgotten, lost, or stolen) or possesses a device that does 
not have the ability to scan for Wi-Fi networks (i.e., does not have an internal wireless 
network interface). The proposed system manages this problem by allowing the user to 
use a one-time login feature. More details will be provided further in this text that explain 
this and similar challenges. 
 
3.5 Challenges  
 
For the proposed system to meet the design requirements of an effective and 
efficient 2FA system (as we have previously defined), some elements in the proposed 
system must be designed carefully in order to achieve the stated goals. Below are some of 
the challenges of achieving such a system. 
3.5.1 Collecting Data from a User’s Mobile Device 
Collecting data from the user is an essential and significant aspect of the proposed 
system. In our proposed system, a mobile device is required to scan for and analyze the 
beacon frames of Wi-Fi access points within range; furthermore, the measurement of the 
RSSI values that indicate a distance to each access point in the area must be securely sent 
to the authentication entity. Because the system is intended to require no interaction on 
the part of users, an application that automatically executes when necessary and manages 




automatically scan and collect data from surrounding Wi-Fi access points, along with 
their RSSI values, and then send the collected information to the remote authentication 
entity. 
3.5.2 Collecting Data from a User’s Login Machine (or Similar) Computer 
A user's login machine (or similar computer) is designated as the terminal used to 
access the proposed system; specifically, it is through it that a user attempts to login to a 
desired resource. Similar to the mobile devices, a login machine’s application is needed 
to scan and collect all of the visible beacon frames from Wi-Fi access points in order to 
measure the RSSI values of each access point in the area, and to securely send the 
collected information to the remote authentication entity. In the proposed system, after 
the user submits SFA characteristics when attempting to login, the machine’s application 
is responsible for automatically executing the scan and aggregating the data from all of 
the broadcast messages (more details are provided in Section 3.4.1). Moreover, the RSSI 
values are measured and the data is submitted to the authentication entity (more details 
were presented in Section 3.4.1). This application must be developed in order to achieve 
a goal of the proposed system. 
3.5.3 Gaining Access 
In this work, gaining access refers to a process in which access to resources is 
granted to a user provided that the user's two devices are physically located in the same 
vicinity. In the proposed system, a novel method for gaining access to a system by 
utilizing the beacon frames and RSSI values of all access points in the area was 
introduced; specifically, utilizing the overlapping access points between the user's two 




entity for processing. This information is then subsequently used to infer a location or 
distance from the access points (more details are provided in Section 3.4.2). By utilizing 
the data collected from the access points, a user's position can be determined. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Many service providers use a 2FA system to enhance account security [61]. 
People use 2FA/DFA on a daily basis for different functions, such as making payments, 
for banking, etc. Furthermore, standard names in industry such as Apple, Google, and 
Microsoft, are increasingly enforcing a 2FA system for their users [62]. The proposed 
system controls access to resources by utilizing what is in a user’s environment. This is a 
significant contribution of this work and what distinguishes it from many other existing 
works. We believe that strengthening the security of 2FA systems is research-worthy. 
Moreover, we believe that structuring the system in such a way that minimizes user 
interaction increases user convenience and potentially, security as well. 
In this chapter, the proposed system’s high-level architecture, features, design 
requirements, operation, and the challenges of creating an effective 2FA system were 
presented. Subsequently, we proposed a high-level picture of a new 2FA system design 
that is intended to meet the proposed design requirements. The challenges involved in 
achieving such a system were then discussed. Achieving the proposed system with 
excellent performance is significant, because it would provide a 2FA system in which the 
location of the user’s devices is verified in a way that guarantees authorized access to 
resources when the user’s devices are in the same physical location, all without requiring 
user intervention (thereby increasing user convenience by implementing a DFA with the 




way by precluding effort from users and without requiring additional infrastructure. We 
believe that designing an unobtrusive and inexpensive 2FA system will encourage 
increased integration of 2FA in access control systems in the future. The next chapter will 








In this chapter, different aspects of the proposed system are evaluated. Moreover, 
the different factors and parameters that play a role in the proposed system's performance 
and security are analyzed. Section 4.1 will present the proposed system's security and its 
response to diverse types of attacks, Section 4.2 will evaluate how convenient the system 
is for the user, Section 4.3 will discuss the privacy of the user in the context of the 
proposed system, Section 4.4 will present a discussion of the robustness of the system, 




To enhance the security of the system, the proposed system implements 2FA as a 
solution. This way, if a user's password is compromised, the security of the system still 
involves another level of authentication (at least two levels of authentication in total). 
Furthermore, this research aims to add an extra layer of authentication in a novel way: by 
utilizing the characteristics in a user’s environment – specifically, by utilizing 
information of ambient access points visible by the user, thus establishing a Wi-Fi 
footprint. Every access point broadcasts messages that carry distinctive information that 
can be used to identify a Wi-Fi footprint. Subsequently, the outcome can be used to 





In section 4.1.2, we examine several types of anticipated attacks that could occur. 
We subsequently present how the proposed system responds to and addresses these 
attacks. 
4.1.1 Security Features 
In this section, the proposed system’s security features are presented. Section 
4.1.1.1 presents the client-side application security for the mobile device and login 
machine. Section 4.1.1.2 shows how the system depends on broadcast messages to limit 
spoofing. Section 4.1.1.3 introduces communication security and more specific 
information regarding what method is being used to protect network communication. 
Section 4.1.1.4 explains how the proposed system is adjustable, by allowing different 
configurations for the different thresholds. Section 4.1.1.5 presents database and 
infrastructure security. Finally, Section 4.1.1.6 explains the strength of the proposed 
system’s second layer of authentication. 
4.1.1.1 The client-side application security 
To ensure client-side security, the mobile device’s application is secured by 
associating it with the mobile device’s IMEI and another available unique identifier of 
the mobile device (e.g., device ID, serial number – or both if needed), as discussed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4. The login machine’s application is secured by associating it with 
the login machine's universally unique identifier (UUID), along with another unique 
identifier (e.g., serial number) if needed, as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. Without 
either of the applications, the user cannot use the proposed system. We realize that users 
may find it inconvenient to download and install the applications on their devices; 




system and increases security. The user must have both in order to utilize the proposed 
system.  Moreover, this is typical of authentication systems in use today that utilize 
mobile devices. 
4.1.1.2 Limitation of spoofing 
The proposed system is designed to be a zero-effort 2FA system that uses signals 
broadcast by Wi-Fi access points for use as a second level of security (a second factor) 
without the need for user intervention. Each access point periodically broadcasts a unique 
beacon frame to all devices in range. The major benefit of this is that the beacon frames 
can be received by a device only while it is within a limited physical range of each 
wireless access point. This intrinsically limits the potential for spoofing or impersonation 
and makes second factor authentication secure. Along with features within the beacon 
frame, the proposed system utilizes the measured RSSI values to calculate the distance 
from the various Wi-Fi access points in range to each user device. Using the RSSI value 
as a means to measure the user's location helps to ensure that the user is within a limited 
physical range of each access point that is scanned and further decreases the chances of 
spoofing or impersonation (i.e., RSSI value can be measured within a limited physical 
range of each wireless access point). The case where an attacker could spoof access 
points and replicate the information (e.g., SSID, BSSID, and RSSI readings) in another 
location will be discussed below in Section 4.1.2.3. 
4.1.1.3 Communication security  
Standard communication security is utilized to prevent an attacker from 
intercepting the communication between the user and the authentication entity. In the 




used to securely transmit information between the user and the authentication entity. 
Through the use of SSL/TLS, the transfer of data and information between the two 
entities occurs in the form of an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. An asymmetric 
key algorithm (also called public key cryptography) uses a pair of related keys in which 
one is used to encrypt and another is used to decrypt in order to protect a message from 
unauthorized access or an unauthorized user. It is not possible to use the same key to both 
encrypt and decrypt the same message. The public key exists publicly on a network such 
as the internet and is obtained when a user wants to securely send a message to the owner 
of the public key (e.g., the authentication entity of our proposed system). Only the private 
key (which is kept with its owner) can be used to decrypt the message. Figure 4-1 
illustrates the process: (1) the user obtains the authentication entity’s public key; (2) the 
authentication entity’s public key is used to encrypt information and transform it from 
plaintext into ciphertext and sends it to the authentication entity; (3) the authentication 
entity receives the encrypted data and decrypts with its private key, allowing it to read the 








4.1.1.4 Parameter adjustability 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the proposed system is adjustable. Specifically, it has 
the ability to adjust the minimum number of access points to use to make an 
authentication decision. The scanning range of the access points can also be adjusted. If 
the range of the system is set to five meters, for example, the system will only use the 
access points that fall within that range of the user's devices. All of these features are 
beneficial for fine-tuning the system and increasing the security; specifically, by 
determining and limiting the range of the system. 
4.1.1.5 Database and infrastructure security 
In the proposed system, the database, web, and application servers are deployed in 
a distributed network in order to avoid a single point of failure. The storage of records in 
plaintext on the database server is limited by applying standard server security: (1) user 
passwords are combined with salt (a random string of data that is added to a user's 
password to minimize the chances that multiple users with the same passwords have the 
same data stored in the database); and (2) the user password/salt combination is hashed 
using a secure hashing algorithm (e.g., SHA-256 which takes variable-sized input and 
produces a fixed-size output). For example, the word “original” is hashed through SHA-
256 hash function and becomes 
“25718360e05d3c2d0963d1381e9dd4dae5fca789244ee4b9f861adcc0cc96218”. 
4.1.1.6 Strong second layer of authentication 
The proposed system is designed to be secure and different from existing 2FA 
approaches that typically require user interaction to authenticate a user. The first 




password for authentication). The second authentication factor is something unique that is 
in the client’s environment (the SSID, BSSID, and RSSI features of the beacon frame). 
Without requiring any interaction from the user, the proposed system authenticates and 
authorizes access based upon these identification and authentication factors. As explained 
in Chapter 5, the user gains access if the two devices meet the following criteria: 
a. The device is positioned such that a predefined number of overlapping access 
points is detected by both of the user's devices; and 
b. The estimated distance from the user's devices to all visible access points falls 
within a predefined range.  
The proposed system depends on two factors to authenticate a user which 
increases the strength of the second layer authentication. 
4.1.2 Cyberattack Vulnerability Assessment 
In this section, the proposed system’s vulnerability to several identified 
cyberattacks are assessed and discussed. Furthermore, the steps taken to address these 
types of attacks are also discussed. Section 4.1.2.1 focuses on identified man-in-the-
middle attacks and how the proposed system is designed to preemptively avoid them. 
Section 4.1.2.2 focuses on eavesdropping attacks and ways to stop an attacker from 
gaining access to data sent over the network. Section 4.1.2.3 looks at the possible 
simulation of the user's environment for obtaining unauthorized access from a location 
outside of a legitimate user's environment and how the use of the custom application on 
the user's login and mobile devices can mitigate these attacks. Section 4.1.2.4 focuses on 




office), and how through the use of special identifiers within the application that are 
installed on a device, this kind of attack is mitigated. 
4.1.2.1 Man-in-the-middle attack 
A man-in-the-middle attack occurs when an attacker is inserted in the system and 
secretly intercepts communication occurring between two entities within the system. In 
the proposed system, this would likely occur in between the user and the authentication 
entity. A man-in-the-middle could transmit (and possibly even alter) communication 
between two parties who believe that they are directly communicating with each other. 
This results in the appearance of normal communication between the two parties. In our 
proposed system, SSL/TLS is utilized for communicating between a user's devices and 
the authentication entity. This protocol is secure and effectively thwarts man-in-the-
middle attacks because the communication between the two parties is encrypted within 
the channel of communication. All communication between the user and the 
authentication entity is encrypted with a secret key that is only known to the user and the 
authentication entity. In the general case, the proposed system utilizes standard 
asymmetric cryptography with asymmetric encryption key exchange protocol (more 
details were provided in Section 4.1.1.3) in order to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks. 
4.1.2.2 Eavesdropping 
In this type of attack, an attacker eavesdrops on the communication between the 
user's device and the authentication entity in order to obtain credential information and 
use it to attempt to authenticate and gain access to a resource. In the proposed system, the 
SSL/TLS protocol is utilized to encrypt communication between a user's device and the 




still be sniffed from network communication; however, an attacker cannot make sense of 
this because it is strongly encrypted. 
4.1.2.3 Simulation of the user's environment 
The proposed system utilizes what is in a user’s environment (specifically, a Wi-
Fi footprint) as an unobtrusive second authentication factor. In this attack, an attacker 
scans the access point information around the user's environment (e.g., an office) – 
specifically, the attacker obtains the SSID, BSSID, and RSSI of the surrounding/visible 
access points. The attacker then proceeds to replicate the user's environment elsewhere, 
where the attacker may have full control of the environment – specifically, the footprint 
of Wi-Fi devices in the environment. In general, an attacker has a relatively low 
probability of obtaining a user's credentials (e.g., username and password) [63]. 
Moreover, a user’s environment can still be obtained; however, the attacker cannot make 
sense of it without the installed client applications because the proposed system is 
designed to establish communication only through the relevant applications. The 
applications also obfuscate the features required within the beacon frame that the 
authentication entity utilizes to identify users and make authentication decisions. 
However, if an attacker was able to obtain the device applications and reverse engineer 
them to work with his own devices, the attacker's device specifics (e.g., IMEI) will not 
match the user's information in the authentication entity's database. Moreover, the 





4.1.2.4 An attacker inside a user’s environment 
By using a device that is Wi-Fi capable, the surrounding user's environment 
(specifically, the Wi-Fi footprint) can be captured. Furthermore, the RSSI values of the 
access points near the user can be measured. In this attack, it is assumed that an attacker 
has the username and password of a user (which is unlikely), while also being nearly in 
the same place as the user (e.g., immediately outside of the user's office). In the 
registration phase of the proposed system, each of the applications that are installed on 
the user’s login machine has metadata associated with the registered user (e.g., the 
applications run on the user's devices which have specific values for IMEI, UUID, and so 
on). Once the user has registered, the IMEI of the mobile device and the UUID of the 
login machine are not allowed to change. Thus, an attacker would not be able to login 
without physically possessing the user's devices; in fact, both the login device and the 
mobile device (since they are booth associated with the users). Ultimately, an attacker 
may be able to collect the data in a user’s environment; however, they will not be able to 
establish communication to the authentication entity without the required applications 
and appropriate user devices. 
 
4.2 User Convenience 
 
In general, user convenience is a critical factor in determining how users make 
decisions about what to use [64]. The proposed system is a zero-effort system, which 
means that a user accesses an information system using two factors of authentication, but 
without the typical hassle involved or having extra steps required for the user (e.g., 
providing a PIN, a phrase, a randomly generated code, or a physical key-based second 




almost always expect to type in their username and password), our proposed method is as 
convenient as SFA, thus making its application easy to use and readily scalable. 
The proposed system is considered to be readily applicable in a scalable manner 
because it relies on ubiquitous Wi-Fi access points. The internet is found almost 
everywhere people live [65]. Due to its ubiquitous nature, the internet is an essential and 
robust platform for education, business, and entertainment. It has been noted that 
locations with reliable internet connectivity are also where access points are commonly 
established [60]. 
Accessing resources requires a user to only submit a username and a password. 
Subsequently, the second layer of authentication is automatically obtained and provided 
to the authentication entity. Moreover, the result of either granting or denying access to 
the user is done within a short period of time. In Chapter 5, an experiment was presented 
to show that the proposed system is capable of a seamless and quick authentication 
procedure. 
Security and convenience are a sliding scale that requires finding the right balance 
between them. Security systems that are more convenient tend to be less secure, while 
security systems that are more secure are generally inconvenient [66]. A convenient 
system is a system that has an acceptable level of inconvenience for the amount of 
security that the system provides [66].  
 
4.3 User Privacy 
 
Most users login to authentication systems from various places (e.g., home, work, 
etc.). The proposed system scans and collects information from the user's environment 




be – and stores this unique information in the authentication entity's database. When the 
user's current session is complete/terminated, all data related to the current session is 
purged from the database to ensure privacy by practicing minimal data collection (i.e., by 




A 2FA system must be robust because failures may hinder a user’s ability to 
utilize the system. In this section, the steps taken to enhance the operational robustness of 
the proposed system are discussed. Section 5.4.1 discusses the potential for the user's 
environment to lack access points, and Section 5.4.2 discusses the potential absence of 
the user’s mobile device. 
4.4.1 Lack of Access Points in the User's Environment 
The proposed system has the ability to function with at least one access point. 
That is, it can operate when there is only one access point in the surrounding environment 
of a user – at minimum (obviously, at least one is needed). This case was tested in 
Experiment 6 discussed in Chapter 5, and the proposed system's access policies were 
initially satisfied with the presence of only one access point. With this in mind, the 
proposed system was able to achieve a favorable outcome, meaning that a user in a 
remote location with possibly only one available access point still has the ability to use 
the proposed system and gain access to authorized resources. 
4.4.2 Absence of the User’s Mobile Device 
As defined previously, the user's authentication device is typically a mobile 
device with the mobile application installed. In this case, the user may not have the 




overlapping access points. The proposed system manages this problem by allowing the 
user to use a one-time login solution. For this feature, the user types in a username and 
answers the security question shown Figure 4-2. A OTP is then sent to the registered 
email (see Figure 4-3), and it can be used by the user to access resources granted through 
the authentication entity.  Admittedly, this has the side effect of requiring user 
interaction, which breaks a fundamental requirement of the proposed system. However, 
this is only used in the case that a user does not have access to the mobile device 
associated with the user's account (which, arguably, is the user's fault). In a typical 















4.5 Cost  
Because the proposed system utilizes existing IEEE 802.11 infrastructure (i.e., 
Wi-Fi access points already in the environment, network interface cards already in 
mobile devices and login machines, etc.), no new hardware is required. The 
authentication system also utilizes the personal devices of users, so no further cost is 
incurred either by users or organizations who wish to implement the proposed system for 
authentication. 
 
4.6 Example Scenario 
 
In this section, we discuss a potential feature of the proposed system that can 
extend its applicability to continuous authentication. This scenario could address a 
number of issues that a user may face; for example, the user forgets or leaves the login 
machine without logging out, potentially leaving the machine accessible to unauthorized 
users. Moreover, it could provide an extra level of security that an organization may wish 
to implement; for example, maintaining access to resources continuously (i.e., 
periodically checking if the user's devices are co-located instead of performing this action 
only once at login), or maintaining access to resources within specific environments (i.e., 
the Wi-Fi footprint must not only be similar for both of the user's devices, but it must also 
be specific in terms of SSIDs and BSSIDs – manually selecting specific Wi-Fi access 
points). We believe that these potential features, although not in the original scope of the 





4.6.1 Session Termination 
The proposed system has the ability to provide continuous authentication with 
zero effort from the user. After access is granted, the user's devices can continuously 
collect and send what is in the user’s environment (the Wi-Fi footprint) to the 
authentication entity for verification. The authentication entity can continuously check if 
the two devices are in the same location in order to maintain access to requested 
resources. The frequency with which the user's devices collect and send the new beacon 
frames can be varied based on requirements. This feature could solve the potential issue 
where a user has logged in to an information system and forgets to log out – or is called 
away. In this case, the proposed system will check if both devices are still co-located in 
order to keep the user's session alive. If not, the session can be automatically terminated. 
An additional experiment (not mentioned in the Chapter 5) was performed to test 
how the proposed system responds when the user’s devices are no longer co-located. In 
this experiment, the range was set to three meters (i.e., three meters was selected because 
the experiment’s goal is to test the proposed system’s response within a small range) in 
order to test the proposed system’s response to terminating a session in such a small 
environment. The maximum change in distance between the user's devices across 
continuous readings was set to less than or equal to 5% of the previous distance, and the 
proposed system was set to check the difference in the distance at one minute intervals in 
order to avoid scanning the same RSSI value repeatedly. In the experiment, using the 
access points that fell within the range of three meters (AP1 and AP15G in Figure 5-4 
below), the system was able to grant the user access based on operation of the system 




authentication device. Once the proposed system detected that the user’s devices were no 
longer in range (after the predetermined interval of one minute), the session was 
immediately terminated. This is shown in Figure 4-4. Twenty trials were implemented, 
and the system achieved a 100% success rate in terminating the user's session once the 
user's devices were not co-located. 
In Figure 4-4, the information that is beneath the words Wifi Name represents the 
SSID of all the access points in the area. The BSSID column represents BSSID of all the 




Figure 4-4: Session termination 
 
 
Also, in the mentioned figure (Figure 4-4) the data that is beneath the column 
category labeled as Mobile is the data that is obtained from the mobile device. The First 
Distance column represents the first calculated distance between the mobile device and 
an access point in meters when the user first logs in. The Last Distance column represents 
the last calculated distance between the mobile device and an access point in meters of 




and Last Distance in meters. The Difference (%) column represents the difference 
between the First Distance and Last Distance as a percentage.  
Also, in Figure 4-4 the data that is underneath the category Desktop, is the data 
gained from the login machine. The First Distance column represents the first calculated 
distance between the login machine and an access point in meters when the user first logs 
in. The Last Distance column represents the last calculated distance between the login 
machine and an access point in meters. The Difference column represents the difference 
between the First Distance and Last Distance in meters. The Difference (%) column 




In this chapter, different aspects of the proposed system were evaluated in the 
context of security, user convenience, user privacy, system robustness, and cost. Moreover, 
the proposed system’s vulnerability to several identified cyberattacks were assessed and 
discussed. Based on results and discussions in this chapter, the proposed 2FA system can 
be considered secure, convenient, robust, and inexpensive. It utilizes existing IEEE 802.11 
infrastructure, the personal devices of the users, and no new hardware is required; 
therefore, no further costs are incurred. The next chapter presents numerous experiments 









In the previous chapter, we discussed the design specifics of the proposed system 
and the challenges faced during the design process. This section presents numerous 
experiments that were utilized to test the proposed system's design in various aspects. 
Experiment 1 will test the location accuracy achievable from using the RSSI in the 
beacon frame of nearby access points obtained by network devices. Experiment 2 will 
examine the proposed system’s authentication accuracy in terms of overlapping access 
points. Experiment 3 will test the RSSI behavior when using different cellphone models. 
Experiment 4 will show the computing and the communication cost of the proposed 
system (i.e., computing the time interval between the user completing a login attempt, 
and the authentication entity delivering an authentication decision). Experiment 5 will 
present the performance of the proposed system when using only one access point to 
perform authentication. Finally, Experiment 6 will examine the security of the mobile 
device application.  For the experiments, the following hardware was utilized: 
1. Access points: In Experiment 1, we used three Netgear R6400 Wi-Fi access 
points to test the location accuracy within a predefined area (see Figure 5-1). 
However, for the other experiments, all of the access points utilized were publicly 
findable in the area (i.e., they were a part of the existing production infrastructure 




2. Authentication entity/resource server: For the authentication entity (which also 
included the user's requested resources), a desktop with an Intel® Xeon® 
processor, 16 GB of RAM, and Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (64-bit) as the operating 
system was utilized. 
3. User devices: For the user devices, a MacBook Pro (13-inch, mid-2012 model) 
with a 2.5 GHz dual-core Intel Core™ i5 CPU and eight GB 1600 MHz DDR3 
was used as the mobile device in the first experiment. For the remaining 
experiments, the following mobile devices were used: (1) Samsung Google 
Nexus S; (2) Samsung Galaxy S9; and (3) Samsung Galaxy S6. These were used 
to test the proposed system using different models of mobile devices. In addition 
to using a MacBook Pro, a Precision 7820 Dell desktop equipped with an Intel 
Xeon processor, 15 GB of RAM, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (64-bit) as the operating 
system, and a Wi-Fi adapter (Alfa AWUS036NH) connected via USB was 










5.1 Experiment 1: Testing Location Accuracy in a Predefined Area 
 
This experiment was conducted to determine the degree to which RSSI values 
obtained from network devices can be used to calculate a device's location. In this 
experiment, we utilized three access points at different locations in a room (see Figure 4-
2). The first access point was set up at (0,0), the at (9, 9), and the third at (0, 18)). The 
room is a typical office space that is approximately 18-ft. by 9-ft.  
Verifying that both devices are in the same physical location can be done using 
information extracted from the Wi-Fi access point broadcast messages. The presence of 
similar information from all nearby Wi-Fi access points acts as the first layer of location 
verification. From there, calculations using RSSI values revise the distance between each 
device and the access points in the area (more details were provided in Chapter 3 Section 
3.4.2). Finally, these measurements are compared to determine if both devices are in the 
same physical location. Based on this outcome, the authentication entity either allows or 
denies access to requested resources. Two access points (AP1 and AP3) were placed at 
the two corners of the room, while the third one (AP2) was placed at the center of the 
wall that is adjacent to the first two access points. This is shown in Figure 4-2 below. The 
exact positions of the three access points were measured and located manually on the 
study site as a preliminary step. Subsequently, the user's device was positioned in the 
room at seven different arbitrary locations. The purpose of choosing seven user device 
positions is because it allowed for the majority of the specific testing room to be covered 
with a reasonable range. Choosing more than seven device positions would not yield 
much, if any, extra coverage or benefit because this amount is the most optimal since it 




to lower the success rate of the system, in effect leaving certain locations within the room 
as possible dead zones. 
For the experiment, the user's mobile device was located at each of the seven 
chosen positions. It then scanned the three Wi-Fi access points, along with their 
corresponding RSSIs. The collected data was used to estimate the user's device location 
using Equations 5-1 through 5-3, which represent the trilateration system in 2D (a 
mathematical technique that locates an object on a coordinate plane using three known 
points). 
( 𝑥 − 𝑥1 )
2 + ( 𝑦 −  𝑦1 )
2 =  𝑑1
2                  (Eq. 5-1) 
( 𝑥 − 𝑥2 )
2 + ( 𝑦 −  𝑦2 )
2 =  𝑑2
2                              (Eq. 5-2) 
( 𝑥 − 𝑥3 )
2 + ( 𝑦 −  𝑦3 )
2 =  𝑑3
2                              (Eq. 5-3) 
where: 
𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 are the unknown location of an object on a coordinate plane (in Experiment 1, 
the user device). 
𝑥1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦1 are the 2D coordinates of 𝐴𝑃1. 
𝑥2𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦2 are the 2D coordinates of 𝐴𝑃2. 
𝑥3𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦3 are the 2D coordinates of 𝐴𝑃3. 
𝑑1 is the distance between 𝐴𝑃1and the user device. 
𝑑2 is the distance between 𝐴𝑃2and the user device. 
𝑑3 is the distance between 𝐴𝑃3and the user device. 
Equation 5-4, which is the simple distance equation (see below) that is utilized to 
calculate a distance between two points on a coordinate plane.  





𝑥1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦1  are the 2D coordinates of the user's mobile device. 
𝑥2𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦2  are the 2D coordinates of the user's login machine. 
Three different tests (using the first RSSI reading, the average of thirty RSSI 
readings, and the median of thirty RSSI reading) were performed to test the location 
accuracy using RSSI as the only feature within the beacon frame. Figure 5-2 shows the 




Figure 5-2: Illustration of the access point setup 
 
 
5.1.1 Calculating the User Device Location Using a Single RSSI Reading 
Wi-Fi adapters periodically scan for nearby Wi-Fi access points; therefore, many 




RSSI readings was restricted to a single reading (i.e., only the first RSSI reading was 
used to calculate the location of the user device). This was done to determine if a single 
reading (and therefore a single RSSI value) was enough to adequately calculate the 
location of the user device. The results are shown in Table 5-1, which shows a 
comparison between the actual location of the device and the calculated location using a 
single RSSI reading. 
 
Table 5-1: The calculated location using a single RSSI reading 
 
Actual points (x, y) Calculated points (x, y) Difference in feet 
(2, 17) (-5.812, 16.635) 7.812 
(3, 2) (6.228, -0,964) 4.382 
(4.5, 9) (0, 9) 4.5 
(5, 14) (4.013, 14.980) 2.216 
(6, 2) (6.083, 4.866) 2.868 
(7, 2) (4.737, 0.120) 2.942 
(8, 16) (9.042, 19.192) 3.358 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, there are two negative coordinate values. 
Obviously the room contains only positive coordinates; however, when calculating 
points, it is possible that negative values exist which effectively put them outside the 
room. This occurs because the RSSI readings are sometimes inconsistent. From the 
results of Table 5-1, it was decided from this experiment that using one RSSI reading is 
not as beneficial as using more than one (which is based on an average of multiple 
readings of RSSI values). 
5.1.2 Calculating Location Using the Average of Thirty RSSI Readings 
For this part of the experiment, the average of thirty RSSI readings was utilized to 




many RSSI readings provided more accuracy with respect to the location of the user 
device. The amount of readings (thirty) was selected because additional readings did not 
factor in significantly. The results are shown in Table 5-2, which shows a comparison 
between the actual location of the device and the calculated location using an average of 
thirty RSSI readings. 
 
Table 5-2: The calculated location using the average of thirty RSSI readings 
 
Actual points (x, y) Calculated points (x, y) Difference in feet 
(2, 17) (5.173, 15.424) 3.543 
(3, 2) (1.443, 7.478) 5.695 
(4.5, 9) (3.893, 9.869) 1.060 
(5, 14) (4.007, 12.636) 1.687 
(6, 2) (6.968, 2.361) 1.033 
(7, 2) (3.226, 4.471) 4.511 
(8, 16) (5.173, 15.424) 3.543 
 
 
As can be seen from the results of Table 5-2, using the average reading of RSSI 
values decreased the difference between the actual points and the calculated points.  
5.1.3 Calculating Location Using the Median of Thirty RSSI Readings 
For this part of the experiment, we used the median of the thirty RSSI readings to 
calculate the location of the user device. This was done to determine if the median of the 
RSSI readings improved the accuracy of the experiment. The results are shown in Table 
5-3, which shows a comparison between the actual location of the device and the 





Table 5-3: The calculated location using the median of thirty RSSI readings 
 
Actual points (x, y) Calculated points (x, y) Difference in feet 
(2, 17) ( 5.591, 15.842 ) 3.773 
(3, 2) ( 1.484, 7.516 ) 5.721 
(4.5, 9) ( 3.893, 9.869 ) 1.06 
(5, 14) ( 3.957, 12.612) 1.737  
(6, 2) ( 6.827, 2.606 ) 1.025  
(7, 2) ( 4.332, 3.438 ) 3.031 
(8, 16) ( 5.392, 10.249 ) 6.315 
 
 
As a result, from this experiment, it shows that using a single RSSI reading is 
quick in terms of time. However, this might not be ideal in terms of accuracy for 
measuring distances between a user’s devices and access points. For example, when the 
actual point (2,17) was calculated using the first reading of the RSSI the difference 
between the calculated point and the actual point was 7.812 feet, as can be seen in Table 
5-1. However, when the difference of the first actual point (2,17) was estimated through 
the use of the average, Table 5-2, the resulting difference was 3.543 feet. For estimating 
the first actual point (2,17) using the median, Table 5-3, the resulting difference was 
3.773 feet. As can be seen in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3, the distances between the 
difference between the actual points and the calculated points decreased. Therefore, using 
the multiple reading of RSSI values is better than using one reading to estimate. In 
addition, RSSI values alone do not provide enough information when trying to determine 
a user’s location. Because the proposed system essentially uses the Wi-Fi footprint, more 
characteristics are needed. Chapter 3 Section 3.3.5 discusses this; specifically, using 




5.2 Experiment 2: Testing the Authentication Success Rate 
The aim of this experiment was to determine a user’s location using the beacon 
frame characteristics (e.g., SSID, BSSID, RSSI, timestamp, and frequency) – which was 
discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.5. In this experiment, we evaluated the authentication 
success rate of the proposed system using RapidMiner because it provides analytics based 
on real life data [68]. RapidMiner is a software platform that is used as a data science tool 
and allows for predictive analysis, text mining, and other general data mining use cases. 
Further modifications were made to the relational database on the authentication entity to 
create an additional table for the purpose of collecting data from the user login attempts 








In Figure 5-3, the user-id column represents the unique identifier of a user. The 
scan-time column represents the timestamp of when this record was inserted. The bssid 
column represents the BSSID of each access point in the area. The ssid column represents 
the name of every access point that was scanned in the area. The level column represents 
the RSSI value that has been measured from the user’s device antenna. The frequency 
column represents the radio frequency type of a scanned access point. 
The table was subsequently utilized by RapidMiner to evaluate the authentication 
success rate. Note that this table was only used during the experiments and was 
subsequently removed. The system was examined using a number of predictive data 
modeling techniques to examine the proposed system’s outcomes. The results of four 
types of predictive data modeling were presented and chosen out of ten models – all of 
the possible models that fit our experiment – according to the best result, two average 
results, and the worst result. The chosen models included random forest (which provided 
the best result), k-nearest neighbors (which provided an average result), decision tree 
(which provided an average result), and random tree model (which provided the worst 
result). Each predictive data model type and its results are shown separately in the 
following subsections. In all of the previous subsections, the proposed system’s 
authentication success rate and accuracy was calculated using Equation 5-5: 
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑁
 ∗ 100                                           (Eq. 5-5) 
 
where: 
TP is the true positive, or that access was granted to a legitimate user and both 




TN is the true negative, or that access was granted to a (potentially) malicious user 
and both devices are co-located. 
N is the total number of access attempts in the experiment. 
5.2.1 Random Forest Model 
Random forest tree is a supervised learning algorithm. Supervised learning takes 
an algorithm that has a dataset containing training samples and target samples, and learns 
the relation between the training samples and their target attributes [69]. The learned 
relation is the applied to classify new samples without targets [65]. To illustrate how a 
supervised method works, an example of predicting the salary of an employee based on 
the number of hours worked which is shown below: 
Suppose that Equation 5-6 calculates the salary of the employee: 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑥)                                                     (Eq. 5-6) 
where: 
x is a function that represents the relation between the salary and number of hours 
that the employee worked. 
x is the input – the number of hours the employee worked. 
Y is the output – the salary that the employee is received. 
 The main goal of the supervised learning algorithm is to predict Y with maximum 
accuracy for a new input x.  
The random forest model is a classification algorithm that uses bagging and 
randomness in building each decision tree (i.e., a structure in which a node represents a 
test, each branch represents the output of a test, and each leaf node represents a class 




any individual tree. The idea of the bagging method is to increase the overall result with a 
combination of learning methods. 
Table 5-4 illustrates the output from the random forest model in a confusion 
matrix (i.e., a table that describes the performance of an algorithm or an information 
system). From Table 5-4, the total number of access attempts is 2,671: the number of true 
positives are 2,296, the number of true negatives are 212, the number of false positives 
are 97, and the number of false negatives are 66. The prediction performance of the 




× 100 =  93.90%                                   (Eq. 5-7) 
 
 
Table 5-4: Random forest model result  
 




Positive 2,296 97 
Negative 66 212 
 
 
5.2.2 k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) Model 
 
The k-nearest neighbor is a classification and regression algorithm that predicts 
the target class of a labeled dataset without prior knowledge or assumptions about the 
data distribution. It applies feature similarity metrics, such as the Euclidean and 
Manhattan distances, to measure how closely related the features of one class target are to 




The Euclidean distance is the distance between two points P and Q, and is defined 




Figure 5-4: Euclidean distance [70] 
 
 
To better understand Manhattan distance a geometric model of a city is 








In this city, the travel direction of all the streets are either straight north and south 
or straight east and west. One block is the distance between neighboring north-south 
streets and one block is also the distance between neighboring east-west streets. It is not 
possible for the travel direction between P and Q to be in a straight path, it has to be 
along the streets using a short direction. The distance between 𝑃(𝑥1, 𝑦1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄(𝑥1, 𝑦1) 
are defined in Equation 5-8. 
𝑑𝐸(𝑃, 𝑄) = |𝑥2 − 𝑥1| + |𝑦2 − 𝑦1|                         (Eq. 5-8) 
In this model, a k-value is set to select the top k points or observations that fall 
within the detected boundary. This process is iterated for all observations in the training 
set, and each point is assigned to the class target where it is most frequently detected. 
Table 5-5 illustrates the confusion matrix of the k-NN model. From Table 5-5, the total 
number of access attempts are 2,712: the number of true positives are 2,317, the number 
true negatives are 203, the number of false positives are 108, the number of false 
negatives are 84. The prediction performance of the model has an accuracy of 92.92% 
(calculated using Equation 5-3) as seen below: 
2,317 +  203
2,712
× 100 =  92.92% 
 
 
Table 5-5: k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) model result 
 




Positive 2,317 108 






5.2.3 Decision Tree Model 
The decision tree is a supervised learning model that learns from a training dataset 
to build simple decision rules for predicting the target class. The decision tree model can 
be used to predict the categorical targets of a “Login” target class with the values 
“Accept” or “Reject.” It can also be applied to predict continuous target classes such as a 
“Price” target class with the values “less than $50” and “greater than or equal to $50.” 
The model works by creating a tree, and then splits/separates the data at each node using 
different tree algorithms based on the class type (e.g., categorical or continuous data 
types: categorical data contains a finite number of distinct groups, while continuous data 
contains an infinite number of values between any two values which are numeric 
variables). This split-and-select-features process is then evaluated against different 
performance measures such as entropy and information gain.  
 Entropy is a measure of uncertainty of a random variable that depends on splitting 
what the decision tree carries [71]. Entropy can be utilized to calculate the homogeneity 
of a sample (i.e., all the variables in a sample have identical traits) in a dataset. Entropy is 
determined using Equation 5-9. 
𝐸(𝐷) =  −∑ 𝑃(𝐿𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑃(𝐿𝑖))                    (Eq. 5-9) 
 
Where:  
E is the Entropy. 
D is the dataset. 
𝑃(𝐿𝑖) is the number ratio of data points in class 𝐿𝑖 to the total number of elements 




Information gain is the major measure used by decision tree algorithms. The 
branch with zero is called a leaf node, and if the information gain is greater than zero, it 
requires further splitting. The information gain can be computed by Equation 5-10. 
𝐼𝐺(𝐴, 𝐷)  =  𝐸(𝐷) − ∑ 𝑃(𝑇𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1  𝐸(𝑇𝑖)                        (Eq. 5-10) 
Where: 
E is the Entropy. 
D is the dataset. 
A is the variable chosen for splitting the dataset. 
𝑇𝑖 is the subsets created from D after splitting with A. 
P(T) is the ratio of the number of elements in 𝑇𝑖 to the number of elements in D.   
In this work, a decision tree model was applied with the information gain 
evaluation method to learn the “Login” class from our data. The output is shown as a 
confusion matrix in Table 5-6. From Table 5-6, the total number of access attempts are 
2,712: the number of true positives are 2,285, the number of true negatives are 214, the 
number of false positives are 97, the number of false negatives are 116. The prediction 
performance of the model has an accuracy of 92.15% (calculated using Equation 5-3) as 
following: 
2,285 +  214
2,712
× 100 =  92.15% 
 
 
Table 5-6: Decision tree model result 
 




Positive 2,285 97 





5.2.4 Random Tree Model 
The random tree model is an earlier variant of a tree structure model for 
classifying a target class from a set of label observations. Random tree structures are 
generated with two estimators to resolve the high and low variance expected in the data. 
This model iterates through a subset of the data to obtain the optimal values for the high 
and low estimators. The estimator parameters are evaluated at a specified confidence 
level before being passed on for final model construction. In our work, we show the 
output from running the random tree model on our data in Table 5-7. From Table 5-7, the 
total number of access attempts are 2,712: the number of true positives are 2,271, the 
number of true negatives are 167, the number of false positives are 144, and the number 
of false negatives are 130. Based on the results, the accuracy is 89.90% (calculated using 
Equation 5-3) as following: 
2,271 +  167
2,712
× 100 =  89.90% 
 
 
Table 5-7: Random tree model result 
 




Positive 2,271 144 
Negative 130 167 
 
 
In the first experiment, RSSI readings are utilized to determine a user’s location. 
However, that experiment was conducted using a single RSSI reading – which is quick in 




distances between a user’s devices and access points. In addition, RSSI values alone are 
not enough to depend on when determining a user’s location.  
In this experiment, RSSI, SSID, and BSSID readings were utilized to determine a 
user’s location. The Random Forest Model provided the best result (93.90%), the k-NN 
Model and the Decision Tree Model provided average results (92.92% and 92.15% 
respectively), and the Random Tree Model provided the worst result (89.90%). However, 
using more of the beacon frame’s characteristics will not increase the accuracy. This 
experiment utilized characteristics of the beacon frame (e.g., last beacon and timestamp), 
but those did not prove more accurate in determining a device's location. The RSSI, 
SSID, and BSSID readings are used together because the RSSI readings are not 
consistent as determined in experiment 1. Regarding the SSID, there is a possibility that 
two access points contain the same SSID. Therefore, the BSSID is included because it 
adds a unique identifier of an access point. Although it is possible that two access points 
have the same BSSID (e.g., through spoofing of the MAC address), this is very rare. 
 
5.3 Experiment 3: Testing the RSSI Behaving Using Different Phone Models 
 
The aim of this experiment was to test the RSSI behavior over time using 
different phone models to reasonably determine if mobile devices used by the general 
public can be reliably used to determine their location using RSSI. In this experiment, an 
application was developed for installation on the mobile devices. This application scans 
for the beacon frames of nearby access points and collects relevant data (such as RSSI) 
that is ultimately packaged and sent to the authentication entity. To thoroughly test this 
application, it was installed on four separate mobile devices (which included a variety of 




Samsung Galaxy S9, Samsung Google OnePlus 3, Samsung Galaxy S4, and Motorola 
Moto Z. These mobile devices were placed next to each other, and each was set to collect 
1,000 RSSI values (a number obtained arbitrarily, but large enough to allow testing of the 
RSSI behavior over time).  Table 5-8 shows the results. 
 










Samsung Galaxy S9 -58 -45 -50.07 2.19 
Google OnePlus 3 -59 -48 -50.97 2.14 
Samsung Galaxy S4 -60 -50 -52.31 1.75 
Motorola Moto Z -57 -49 -51.74 2.00 
All Models  -60 -45 -51.27 2.19 
 
 
From the table, it can be observed that the RSSI measurements are approximately 
the same across the four device models. This is likely due to the fact that the internal 
omni-directional antennas of mobile phones are necessarily small. Thus, the gain value of 
small omni-directional antennas is theoretically limited [72]. In practice, this does not 
exceed five dB which results in very little changes in received signal strength. The 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has limits on the gain of Wi-Fi antennas 
[73], and these limits effectively assure similar RSSI readings across typical mobile 
devices used by typical users in the proposed system. 
 
5.4 Experiment 4: Testing the Computing and Communication Cost 
 
The aim of this experiment was to calculate the time interval between the user 
completing a login attempt and the authentication entity delivering an authentication 
decision. This is important because the proposed system needs to be convenient for users; 




for users to use the system. In this experiment, a test user logged in 50 times, a number 
arbitrarily selected to provide enough data points. The duration of time that it took the 
user to login was measured. The output of the elapsed time of each attempt was logged. 
Table 5-9 shows the experiment’s result. 
 









8.77 5.98 16.29 1.96 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5-10 and Figure 5-6, the proposed system achieved better 
results when compared to a number of competing 2FA systems (SMS/Voice message, 
Google Authenticator, USB security key, and Google prompt/push notification) that were 
used to login into a Gmail account. These methods had a login duration range of 14 to 













Figure 5-7: Total time of logging in (in seconds) for different types of 2FA systems [74] 
 
 
5.5 Experiment 5: Testing the Proposed System’s Robustness  
Through Implementation 
 
The aim of this experiment was to test the robustness of the proposed system 
through implementation of the complete verification processes (more details were 
provided in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2) with a minimum number of access points. The rate 
of Wi-Fi devices scanning for beacon frames was set to one minute because most devices 
support scanning at 30 second intervals or more.  Scanning more frequently results in 
duplicate RSSI values from previous scans. In the authentication entity, the acceptable 
range of a user’s device to Wi-Fi access points was set to 10-meters (which is an area that 
can be used to simulate a typical office environment). Furthermore, the number of 
required nearby access points in the Wi-Fi footprint was set to one or more in order to 
test the robustness of the proposed system by implementing the verification processes 




(i.e., this number was selected because every time the experiment was run the same result 




Figure 5-8: Result of testing the proposed system’s robustness through implementing the 
verification processes  
 
 
Figure 5-8 shows a user’s successful login attempt. The information that is 
beneath the Wifi Name column represents the SSID of all the access points in the area. 
The BSSID column represents the BSSID of all the access points in the area.  
Also, in the mentioned figure (Figure 5-8) the data that is beneath the Mobile 
column is the data that is gained from the mobile device. The First Distance column 
represents the first calculated distance between the mobile device and an access point in 
meters when the user first logs in. The Last Distance column represents the last 




scan. The Difference column represents the difference between the First Distance and 
Last Distance in meters. The Difference (%) column represents the difference between 
the First Distance and Last Distance as a percentage.  
Also, in Figure 5-8 the data that is beneath the Desktop column is the data gained 
from the login machine. The First Distance column represents the first calculated 
distance between the login machine and an access point in meters when the user first logs 
in. The Last Distance column represents the last calculated distance between the login 
machine and an access point in meters at the time of scan. The Difference column 
represents the difference between the First Distance and Last Distance in meters. The 
Difference (%) column represents the difference between the First Distance and Last 
Distance as a percentage. 
As can be observed from Figure 5-8, there are two access points that meet all of 
the parameters (denoted in blue).  There is one access point that meets all of the 
requirements except for being within range of ten meters (denoted in purple); therefore, 
the proposed system ignored it. 
As a result, the proposed system successfully implemented the verification 
processes with two access points. Furthermore, all the authentication attempts from this 
experiment shows that the proposed system has the ability to implement the verification 
processes with a minimum number of access points. 
 
5.6 Experiment 6: Lack of Access Points 
 
The aim of this experiment was to test the robustness of the proposed system in 
implementing the access policies stated earlier: (1) There exists at least a predefined 




distance from the devices to all access points falls within a predefined range. Specifically, 
this experiment ensures this with a single access point. In the worst case, a user may have 
only one access point visible in the surrounding area. For this test, the Wi-Fi footprint 
was fixed at one access point in order to further examine the robustness of the proposed 
system. The acceptable range of a user’s device to the Wi-Fi access point was set to two 
meters to test the accuracy and robustness of the proposed system in such a small range 
from the access point. The proposed system was set to authenticate at intervals of one 
minute as in the last experiment. This was repeated for a total length of 20 minutes, this 
length of time was selected because the result would begin to repeat after this amount of 
time (i.e., the devices only have a certain scan range and after this amount of time the 
device will get similar values since the change in distance in between scans is negligible). 
The threshold set for the range between the user's two devices was set to three meters 
(i.e., they must be no more than three meters to be considered co-located) to examine the 
robustness of the proposed system with a lack of access points in a small environment. 
The results in Table 5-10 show the estimated distance between the two devices and the 
access point. 
 
Table 5-10: Result using one access point 
 
 
Mobile Device Login Machine 














Percent Error  
(from 2m) 
15% 0% 10% 10% 25% 0% 
 
 
As seen in Table 5-10, the difference between the actual distance of two meters 




Therefore, with only one access point the proposed system was able to implement and 
authenticate the user. 
 
5.7 Experiment 7:  Mobile Device Application Security 
 
The goal of this experiment was to test the security of the mobile device 
application against malicious activity. For example, suppose that an attacker attempts to 
login to the authentication entity through the mobile device application using credential 
information that is not registered under the compromised user's mobile device (i.e., the 
mobile device's IMEI and device ID are not registered to the user that the attacker is 
attempting to login as). In this experiment, the proposed system’s mobile device 
application was measured against a login request with credential information that is not 
associated with the mobile device IMEI and device ID. For this experiment, five logins 
(i.e., 20 logins were attempted, but following the first five attempts all the results were 
the same) were attempted with a number of usernames and passwords that were not 
associated with the mobile device IMEI of a specific user account. As can be seen below 








 As a result of the experiment, associating the mobile device application with the 
unique identifiers of a mobile device (i.e., IMEI, device ID) was useful in preventing an 
unauthorized user from logging in (more details about this type of attacks were provided 
in Chapter 5 Section 5.1.2).  
 
5.8  Experiment 8: Battery Consumption 
 
The goal of this experiment was to determine how much of the battery is being 
consumed by the mobile device application in its required tasks in the proposed system. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1, the mobile device application runs in the 
background of the mobile device. In this experiment, a Samsung S6 was utilized and was 
first fully charged (100%). Once the battery percentage reached the 49%, the battery 
usage by the mobile application was checked.  As can be seen in Figure 5-10 the battery 








From this, we conclude that the mobile device application does not result in 
significant battery consumption while it runs in the background. However, a user may 
disable the application by selecting FORCE STOP in one of the phone's app setting 









In this chapter, several experiments were performed. These experiments were 
used to test and address aspects of the proposed system, and the results were incorporated 
into design decisions. The location accuracy, the authentication accuracy, the RSSI 




and the robustness of the proposed system were examined under various circumstances. 






CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
6.1.  Conclusions 
 
Today, digital information decisively permeates all aspects of modern society 
[75]. In such a connected world, one of the critical factors in maintaining the security of 
transmitted data is user authentication [76] [77]. User authentication is considered to be a 
critical factor in the first layer of security, which establishes confidence in the user 
identities presented to an information system [78]. Over time, the definition of user 
authentication has not changed; however, a simple password is no longer the only factor 
used for authenticating a user [79]. 2FA was proposed to provide a high level of security 
by adding more than one layer of authentication. For the most part, these layers of 
authentication are based on knowledge, ownership, biometrics, and/or the behaviors of 
users [80]. 
At present, there are many 2FA systems in use where security requirements are 
higher than usual [81] [82]. If we categorize them based on the submitted effort of users, 
then a few fall into the category of zero effort. One of the strengths of the proposed 
system is that it is a zero-effort two-factor authentication system. The proposed system is 
a 2FA security scheme that manages access to resources with no required effort from a 




that attempts to take advantage of the current IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, making the 
proposed system directly implementable within existing infrastructure and widely usable. 
Currently, there is relatively little research that addresses 2FA in a zero-effort way 
for users. The existing zero-effort studies largely depend on the ambient sound in the 
user’s environment. However, these studies may not fit all environments because they 
depend on the ability to listen to ambient sound. In addition, not all devices are equipped 
with a built-in microphone. Also, the user may be unable to find an environment with the 
right noise levels for the software when needed [44]. If there is a single loud source of 
noise, such as a television playing in the background, construction, or music, it may also 
be possible to trick the system into perceiving the mobile device to be in the same 
location as the authentication device [57]. The possibility of “overhearing” important, 
private information can lead to significant security vulnerabilities or infringe on the 
privacy of users [58]. Most of the current work results in more involvement by users 
through required effort in implementing the second layer of authentication. This could be 
considered inconvenient for the user. 
The proposed solution aims to add an extra layer of authentication by finding 
something unique that is in a user’s environment; specifically, by utilizing information at 
ambient access points (a Wi-Fi footprint). This system depends on something that a user 
knows, something that a user owns, and something that is in the user’s environment – 
arguably the most significant contribution of this work. Primarily due to the proposed 
system removing the “weak link” from the second authentication factor, the proposed 




6.2 Future Work 
The goal of this work is to present a 2FA system that requires no effort from users 
when implementing the second layer of authentication. Although we consider this goal to 
have been achieved, there are many improvements that could be made in order to extend 
the work. Below are some potential future directions: 
6.2.1 Collecting Wi-Fi Footprints Through the Login Machine 
In the proposed system, a custom application serves as the gateway to accessing 
resources through the authentication entity. With the application, a user's devices can 
automatically collect beacon frames from visible Wi-Fi access points and select specific 
features for use by the authentication entity for the purposes of granting access to 
resources. In future work, exploring a way to remove the need for a custom application 
on the user's login device and utilize a web browser instead to scan and collect data from 
the beacon frames would be ideal.  Since users enter their username and password using 
this mechanism, additionally implementing the login machine's scanning of the Wi-Fi 
footprint would be ideal and remove the need for installing the application on the login 
machine. 
6.2.2 Continuous Authentication  
In Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, some potential issues that a user might face while 
using our system were discussed. The prospective solutions for these issues can be 
implemented with continuous authentication and still require zero effort from the user. In 
future work, this continuous authentication feature could be considered as one of the 
primary functions in the proposed system to increase its security without placing any 




system requires no more intervention other than simply entering a username and 
password. 
6.2.3 Estimating the Distance Between the User’s Devices 
As explained in Chapter 3, the proposed system implements a second layer of 
authentication that utilizes something unique in a user’s environment. Every access point 
broadcasts messages that carry distinctive information that can be used to identify a 
user’s environment. This information can subsequently be used to influence the outcome 
of user authentication to requested resources. In this study, data within these broadcast 
messages were utilized to implement a second layer of authentication by determining if 
two devices are in the same physical location. In future work, a method of more precisely 
calculating the distance between the user’s two devices could be studied in order to 
increase the accuracy of the system.  This would be particularly relevant to the 











This appendix contains the source code that is implemented in the proposed 
system. The source code is written in Python. The first listing includes functions 
implemented at the authentication entity such as: (1) receiving the collected data (i.e., 
SSID, BSSID, RSSI readings) from a user’s devices; (2) calculating the distances 
between a user’s devices (i.e., mobile device and login machine) with every access point 
in an area; (3) accessing the proposed system’s database; and (4) inserting calculated 








import sys   
import os   
import math   
import mysql.connector   
from mysql.connector import Error   
from datetime import datetime   
import time   
 
 
tables = ["mobile","desktop"]     
#  the equation that is used to calculate the distance between a user’s 
devices and every access point// 
 
def getDist(rssi, frq, DevID): #  (RSSI, Wave Le, Device ID) // 
  try:   
    PLE = [2.7, 2.7] #  [Mobile, Desktop] Path Loss Exponent value //   
    WaveLen = [0.125, 0.05]  #  [2.4g,5g] Wavelength Values // 
    if int(frq) < 5000:  w = 0   
    else:  w = 1   
    PL_log = 20.0 - float(rssi)   
    PL0 = 20.0 * math.log10((4.0*math.pi)/WaveLen[w])   
    d = float(pow(10,(PL_log - (PL0))/(10.0*PLE[DevID])))   
  except:   
    d = 0.0, 0.0   
  finally:   
    return d, d;   
       #  Accessing the proposed system’s database // 
def Select(sql):   
  rec = [];   
  try:   
    conn = mysql.connector.connect(host='localhost', database='cron_jobs', 
user='root', password='password')   
    if conn.is_connected():     
      cur = conn.cursor()   
      cur.execute(sql)   
      rec = cur.fetchall()   
  except:   
    rec = [];   
  finally:   
    if conn.is_connected():   
      conn.close()   
    return rec;   
 
    #  Insert Data into the database  // 
def Upload(devID, rssi, freq, Tot, n, userid, bssid, scantime, firstDist, 
isEnd):   
  ret = [Tot, n];   




    Dist, DistF = getDist(rssi,freq,devID); Tot += Dist; n += 1;   
    if n == 1 or isEnd:   
      saveLog('\tUserID: '+str(userid)+'\t'+tables[devID].capitalize()+': \t 
BSSID: '+str(bssid)+'\tTime: '+str(scantime)+'\t RSSI: '+str(rssi)+'\tDist: 
'+str(round(firstDist,3))+' --> '+str(round(Tot/n,3))+'\n');   
      saveDist(devID, firstDist, (Tot/n), userid, bssid);    
      Tot = 0; n = 0;   
    sql = 'UPDATE IGNORE '+tables[devID]+'_data SET recorded = 0 WHERE 
user_id='+userid+' AND bssid=\''+bssid+'\' AND scan_time <= \''+scantime+'\';'   
    Execute(sql);   
    if devID == 0:   
      dm_sql = 'INSERT INTO classification_data (mac, m_dist,m_freq, 
m_level,mobile_time) values 
(\''+bssid+'\','+str(Dist)+','+str(freq)+','+str(rssi)+', \''+scantime+'\');'   
    else:   
      dm_sql = 'UPDATE IGNORE classification_data SET d_dist='+str(Dist)+', 
d_freq='+str(freq)+', d_level ='+str(rssi)+', desktop_time =\''+scantime+'\' 
WHERE mac = \''+bssid+'\' AND desktop_time IS NULL;'   
    Execute(dm_sql);   
    #saveLog(sql)   
    ret = [Tot, n];   
  except Exception as e:   
    PrintErr();   
  finally:   




The second listing includes functions at the authentication entity such as: (1) 
finding devices that have active sessions; (2) finding the overlapping access points; and 






from myscript import getDist, saveDist, Select, Execute, saveLog, Upload   
import sys   
import os   
import math   
from datetime import datetime   
import time   
   
 
#### Find devices that have active sessions 
  tables = ["mobile","desktop"]   
  for i in range(N):       
    dev_rec = Select('SELECT user_id FROM cron_jobs.device_data WHERE 
status=1;');   
   
#### Finding the overlapping access points ) ### 
    m_Tot, m_Ave, d_Tot, d_Ave, Tot = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]   
    d_bssid = ''; m_bssid = ''; bssid = '';   
    for dev_row in dev_rec:   
      USER_ID = str(dev_row[0]);   
      sql = 'SELECT DISTINCT d.bssid, d.ssid,'\   
                   'max(d.level), max(d.scan_time) dscan_time, 
max(d.frequency), max(d.last_beacon_time), max(d.scan_count), d.recorded,'\   
                   'max(m.level), max(m.scan_time) mscan_time, 
max(m.frequency), max(m.time_last_seen), max(m.scan_count), m.recorded, 
IFNULL(ms.desktop_first,-1), IFNULL(ms.mobile_first,-1) '\   
                   'FROM desktop_data d INNER JOIN mobile_data m ON m.BSSID = 
d.BSSID AND m.user_id = d.user_id '\   
                   'LEFT JOIN measurement_data ms ON (ms.user_id = d.USER_ID 
and ms.BSSID = d.BSSID) '\   
                   'WHERE d.user_id = '+USER_ID+' '\   
                   'AND (d.recorded = -1 AND m.recorded = -1) '\   
                   'GROUP BY d.bssid, d.ssid,  '\   
                   'd.recorded, '\   
                   'm.recorded, '\   
                   'IFNULL(ms.desktop_first,-1), IFNULL(ms.mobile_first,-1) '\   
                   'ORDER BY d.bssid, dscan_time, mscan_time;'   
      rec = Select(sql);       
      l = len(rec)    
      if (l > 0): # Minimum matching more than zero   
        #saveLog('\n-----------------------------------------------------------
----------------\n');           
        saveLog(str(l)+' Matching Records Found\n ')   
        saveLog('--------------------------------------------------------------
-------------\n');   
 
saveLog('**********************************************************************




# Minimum matching more than zero Creating the overlapping access points table 
        j, n, d_j, M_n, D_n = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0];   
        M_Tot, D_Tot = [0.0, 0.0];    
        Tot += l   
        checkDev = True;    
          while True:   
          n += 1   
          if j == 0 or BSSID != rec[j][0]:   
            checkDev = True;   
            BSSID, SSID, D_SCANTIME, M_SCANTIME, D_FIRST, M_FIRST = [rec[j][0], 
rec[j][1], rec[j][3], rec[j][9], rec[j][14], rec[j][15]]   
            DevID, m_j, d_j, M_n = [0, 0, j, 0]   
            sql = 'INSERT IGNORE INTO measurement_data (user_id, 
bssid,mobile_diff,desktop_diff,diff) VALUES ('+USER_ID+', 
\''+BSSID+'\',1.0,1.0,1e3);';   
            saveLog('\n--------------------------------------------------------
-------------------\n['+SSID+']\n');   
            Execute(sql);   
            isEnd = False;   
         
          if DevID == 0 and D_SCANTIME == rec[j][3]:   
            Rssi, ScanTime, Freq, BeaconTime, ScanCount, Proc = rec[j][8:14];   
            isEnd = (j+1 == l or BSSID != rec[j+1][0] or D_SCANTIME != 
rec[j+1][3]);   
            M_Tot, M_n = Upload(DevID, Rssi, Freq, M_Tot, M_n, USER_ID, BSSID, 
str(ScanTime), M_FIRST, isEnd);   
            m_j += 1; j += 1;    
           
          if isEnd or DevID == 1:   
            DevID = 1;   
            Rssi, ScanTime, Freq, BeaconTime, ScanCount, Proc = rec[d_j][2:8];   
            isEnd = (d_j+m_j+1 >= l or BSSID != rec[d_j+m_j][0]);   
            D_Tot, D_n = Upload(DevID, Rssi, Freq, D_Tot, D_n, USER_ID, BSSID, 
str(ScanTime), D_FIRST, isEnd);   
            d_j += m_j; j = d_j;     
          if j >= l:    
            
saveLog('**********************************************************************
*****\n');   
            break;   
      sql = 'UPDATE IGNORE measurement_data SET mobile_diff = ABS(mobile_last-
mobile_first)/mobile_first, desktop_diff = ABS(desktop_last-
desktop_first)/desktop_first WHERE mobile_first IS NOT NULL AND desktop_first 
IS NOT NULL;';   
      Execute(sql);   
      sql = 'UPDATE IGNORE measurement_data SET diff = ABS(mobile_last-
desktop_last) WHERE mobile_last IS NOT NULL AND desktop_last IS NOT NULL;';   
      Execute(sql);   
      rec.clear()   
    dev_rec.clear()   




except Exception as e:   
  exc_type, exc_obj, exc_tb = sys.exc_info()   
  fname = os.path.split(exc_tb.tb_frame.f_code.co_filename)[1]   
  print(exc_type, fname, exc_tb.tb_lineno)   
  saveLog('Error')   
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